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Summary 
As of 2004, with the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
has been granted a possibility to substitute its infringement procedure in 
competition law enforcement, for a simplified commitment procedure. The 
major difference lies in that instead of having to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the behaviour of one or more undertakings, and follow this 
investigation with a finding of infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU and 
a possible fine, the Commission can now accept commitments from 
undertakings addressing its competition concerns. The Commission must 
only conduct a preliminary investigation, concluding that it intends to adopt 
an infringement decision in order for this option to become available, in 
accordance with Article 9 of the regulation. This essay aims to investigate the 
positive and negative aspects of the commitment procedure. A further aim is 
to analyse the possibilities for a third party of challenging a commitment 
decision. 
 
This possibility brings with it several positive outcomes as well as many 
possible detriments. On the positive side are aspects such as a greater 
efficiency in competition enforcement and a more effective use of the 
Commission’s resources – the Commission being the main enforcer of EU 
competition law. Another positive outcome is that this development was at 
large a codification of something that was already occurring, however 
previously without any possibility of actually enforcing the offered 
commitments. The negative impacts of the procedure include a decline in 
legal certainty, and a lack of consideration for the interests of third parties, 
consumers as well as the public interest. Concerns have also been expressed 
regarding the possibility for the Commission to use the procedure as a way of 
regulating specific markets, and taking the adjudication on novel legal issues 
into its own hands. 
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Especially after the CJEU developing some jurisprudence there are concerns 
relating to an overuse of the procedure, and that the procedure will be used as 
a loophole for the Commission in order to escape judicial review. In the cases 
Commission v Alrosa and Morningstar v Commission, the CJEU has granted 
the Commission a vast degree of discretion as to what commitments it may 
accept, limiting its own scope for judicial review drastically compared to in 
infringement decisions. The two rulings are the only cases where the EU 
Courts have ruled on the validity of a commitment decision, and in both cases 
the appeal before the Court came from a third party applicant. Research shows 
that an undertaking subject to a commitment decision has never brought an 
action for appeal. In Alrosa the applicant, with the same name, was a business 
partner to the undertaking which has offered commitments to the 
Commission. Alrosa considered the commitments to be disproportionate in 
that they were too onerous. In Morningstar the applicant was a competitor of 
the view that the commitments were not enough to address the competition 
concerns expressed by the Commission. 
 
Both cases were ruled in favour of the Commission, and in my opinion the 
message is quite clear: the current legal situation does not seem to provide 
third parties with any real possibilities of challenging commitment decisions. 
As it seems third parties are the only actual parties currently submitting 
appeals to commitment decision, the limiting of their doing so may mean 
limiting the real possibility for judicial review of commitment decisions. The 
current legal situation does in my view not offer an appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions. 
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Sammanfattning 
Sedan 2004, när förordning 1/2003 trädde ikraft, har kommissionen givits en 
möjlighet att ersätta sitt förfarande för överträdelsebeslut inom tillämpningen 
av konkurrensrätt, med ett förenklat förfarande där specifika åtaganden görs 
bindande gentemot företag. Den huvudsakliga skillnaden ligger i att istället 
för att behöva genomföra en grundlig utredning gällande ett eller flera 
företags ageranden, och därefter fatta ett beslut om överträdelse av antingen 
Artikel 101 eller 102 FEUF, ofta inkluderande en bot, kan kommissionen nu 
godta åtaganden från de berörda företagen vilka har som syfte att undanröja  
kommissionens betänkligheter. Kommissionen behöver enbart göra en 
preliminär bedömning, och med bakgrund i denna avse att fatta ett beslut om 
att en överträdelse ska upphöra för att detta alternativ ska bli tillgängligt, i 
enlighet med artikel 9 i förordningen.  Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka 
de positiva och negativa aspekterna av åtagandeförfarandet. Ett ytterligare 
syfte är att analysera möjligheterna för tredje parter att utmana ett 
kommissionsbeslut som gör sådana åtaganden bindande.  
 
Möjligheten stadgad i artikel 9 bär med sig såväl ett antal positiva  
konsekvenser, som flertalet negativa sådana. På den positiva sidan finns 
aspekter såsom en ökad effektivitet i tillämpningen av konkurrensrätten samt 
en nyttigare användning av kommissionens resurser – då kommissionen har 
rollen som den huvudsaklige tillämparen av EUs konkurrensrätt. Ytterligare 
en behållning är att utvecklingen av ett formellt åtagandeförfarande i stort 
egentligen var en kodifiering av vad som redan pågick, dock tidigare utan 
praktiskt möjlighet att göra åtaganden formellt bindande gentemot de berörda 
företagen och därmed hålla dem till dessa. De negativa inverkningarna av 
förfarandet innefattar ett avtagande i rättssäkerheten, och en brist på hänsyn 
gentemot tredje parters intressen, konsumenters intressen och det allmänna 
intresset. Bekymmer har även uttryckts vad gäller möjligheten för 
kommissionen att använda åtagandeförfarandet som ett sätt att reglera 
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specifika marknader och sektorer, och därmed ta prövningen av nya rättsliga 
frågor och dilemman i sina egna händer. 
 
Särskilt sedan EU-domstolen utvecklat praxis på området råder 
betänkligheter kring en överanvändning av förfarandet, samt att förfarandet 
kan komma att användas som ett kryphål för kommissionen för att slippa 
undan domstolsgranskning. I fallen Kommissionen mot Alrosa och 
Morningstar mot kommissionen  har EU-domstolens båda instanser givit 
kommissionen ett omfattande utrymme för skönsmässig bedömning gällande 
vilka åtagande den är villig att acceptera, Därmed begränsas domstolens eget 
utrymme för granskning drastiskt jämfört med för överträdelsebeslut. De två 
rättsfallen är de enda där EU-domstolen har beslutat om giltigheten för ett 
åtagandebeslut, och i båda fallen kom överklagandet från en tredje part. 
Undersökningar visar att ett företag som själv är föremål för ett 
åtagandebeslut aldrig har begärt överprövning av kommissionens beslut. I 
Alrosa kom begäran från en affärspartner till det företag som hade erbjudit 
kommissionen åtaganden. Den sökande ansåg att åtagandena var 
oproportionerliga i det att de var alltför långtgående. I Morningstar var den 
sökande  en konkurrent, med synen att åtaganden inte var tillräckliga för att 
undanröja kommissionens konkurrensrättsliga betänkligheter.  
 
Båda fallen blev beslutade till förmån för kommissionen, och i min mening 
är budskapet relativt tydligt: det gällande rättsläget verka inte erbjuda tredje 
parter några reella möjligheter att överklaga kommissionsbeslut som gör 
åtagande bindande. Då det verkar som att tredje parter är de enda som faktiskt 
söker överprövning gentemot sådana beslut, kan en begräsning såsom denna  
innebära en begräsning av den faktiska möjligheten för granskning av 
åtagandebeslut. Det rådandet rättsläget erbjuder i min åsikt inte tillräckliga 
möjligheter för rättslig granskning av åtagandebeslut.  
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Abbreviations 
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GC  General Court 
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TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction to the Research 
 
This essays centrals around the possibility, granted through Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/20031, of making commitments binding upon undertakings as a 
means of addressing any concerns the European Commission might have as 
regards to compliance with the EU competition rules. Since the possibility 
became available in 2004 it has been frequently used and widely debated. In 
its ruling in case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa2 2010 the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) had its first opportunity to deliver an opinion on the 
procedure. My research focuses on the implications of the ruling in Alrosa 
and the recent ruling by the General Court (GC) in case T-76/14 Morningstar 
v Commission3, mainly the effects the cases have, and will have on the 
possibility for appropriate judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions. 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions  
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 states that in a case where the Commission 
intends to initiate investigations into the conduct of one or more undertakings 
regarding their compliance with the competition rules laid down in Article 
101 or 102 TFEU, the undertakings may offer commitments - changes in 
behaviour or structure. If the Commission concludes these commitments are 
enough to put their competition concerns to rest they may adopt a decision 
making these commitments binding on the undertakings. My aim is to provide 
some clarity as concerns the positive aspects and effects which may result 
from this procedure, as well as look into the negative aspects of Article 9 and 
critique the commitment procedure has received. Is it possible that what 
started out as, in my view, a positive development for the public competition 
                                                
1Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–
25. Articles 81 and 82 of the then EC Treaty have since (without any modification) become 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In this paper I will systematically refer to the current numbers. 
2 C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa, ECLI:EU:C:2010:377. 
3 T-76/14 Morningstar v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:481. 
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procedure has also started a negative development vis-à-vis e.g. legal 
certainty and predictability? When most cases are resolved through this 
negotiated form, suddenly a lot of jurisprudence is evolving at the hands of 
the Commission instead of the EU Courts.  
 
A very central concept for my research is that of discretion. The Commission 
was granted a very wide discretion by the ECJ in Alrosa4, as to what 
commitments it may accept in order to put a suspected infringement to an end. 
In addition, the proportionality assessment under Article 9 is not at all as strict 
as if the Commission were to adopt a so-called infringement decision under 
Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. Infringement decisions prohibit undertakings 
from conducting certain behaviour as this behaviour infringes EU 
competition law, and impose remedies in order to put infringements to an end.  
The result is a Commission which is not required to investigate whether, or 
prove that, a commitment decision is proportionate to the same extent as if it 
had adopted an infringement decision where it was the author of the remedies. 
This is combined with the fact that whatever remedies the Commission 
includes in a commitment decision, the EU Courts will at length refrain from 
assessing it, as they will trust the Commission has made a right and just 
assessment of the situation, on account of the wide discretion it holds.  
 
Further I wish to scrutinize what the actual possibilities are for a third party, 
harmed by a commitment decision, to challenge it in front of a court, as both 
Alrosa and Morningstar came about due to third party challenges. In 
particular, my focus lies on suspected infringements of Article 102 TFEU – 
abuse of a dominant position, and third party challenges. If a dominant 
undertaking is causing competition concerns as of its compliance with Article 
102, that undertaking will determine what commitments it may be willing to 
offer. The cause of concern might be the entry into one, or more, specific 
business agreements, however the other party or parties do not have any real 
input when it comes to the commitments offered to the Commission. This was 
                                                
4 C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa, paras 61-67.  
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the scenario in Alrosa. In recent GC ruling from 2016, Morningstar, the issue 
was that of a competitor with an opinion that the commitments made binding 
upon an undertaking were not enough to address the competition concerns 
expressed by the Commission. In both cases the Commission’s commitment 
decision has remained. To fulfil the purpose of this essay I pose the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the positive aspects of the commitment procedure available 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003? 
2. What are the dangers of granting the Commission such a wide margin 
of discretion as the ECJ did in Alrosa in adopting decisions? 
3. Given the Commission’s wide margin of discretion, and the rulings in 
both Alrosa and Morningstar, what are the real possibilities for a third 
party to successfully challenge a commitment decision? Are 
commitment decisions protected from an appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny? 
1.2 Delimitations   
I am aware that the case which is the main subject of my focus, Alrosa, is 
from 2010, making the ruling 7 years old. However, it is the only case of its 
kind, where the ECJ has delivered a ruling on the appeal of a commitment 
decision, and hence it has been the centre of a lot of debate. The ECJ has since 
not taken on a similar case. There was up until recently no knowledge of how 
the CJEU would tackle a case coming from a competitor dissatisfied with 
commitments for the opposite reason – namely that a set of commitments are 
not enough to address competition concerns. With the Morningstar ruling 
delivered by the GC in 2016, the window of successfully challenging a 
Commission decision now seems even smaller. The GC did not back down 
from the Alrosa jurisprudence, despite the critique following that case. This 
also despite the fact that the GC in Alrosa actually delivered a ruling in favour 
of the applicant, annulling the Commission Decision in question, a ruling 
drastically altered by the ECJ.  
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The research in this essay is limited to the commitment procedure in relation 
to Article 102 TFEU, as both rulings at the centre of my investigation started 
out with the Commission accepting commitments which would address its 
competition concern relating to abuse of a dominant position. In fact, a great 
deal of cases dealt with under Article 9 are such were the Commission has 
concerns regarding Article 102 TFEU and abuse of dominance.5 As analysing 
the commitment procedure is relation to Article 101 TFEU does not fall 
within the scope of this essay, the settlement procedure in cartel cases will 
not be accounted for.6  
 
The research is also limited to the public enforcement procedure laid down in 
Regulation 1/2003, meaning the private enforcement procedure is not 
analysed or elaborated on. In some sections the possibility for private 
enforcement is mentioned to provide some context, however the eventual 
possibility of targeting a commitment decision through private enforcement 
is not taken into account when answering the research questions posed in this 
essay. As for public enforcement, the procedural aspects are not developed 
on, as this is not within the scope of the research. Neither is the possibility to 
challenge a commitment decision, or any EU act, on procedural grounds 
included. The decentralised enforcement model and the public enforcement 
acted out by NCAs and national courts is only analysed to the extent that is 
relevant to my research, more specifically regarding the balance of power 
between national authorities and the Commission. 
 
Any concerns as to the effects of the commitment procedure prior to its 
entering into force are also excluded from the scope of this essay as the 
procedure has now been available for so many years. I find it more relevant 
                                                
5 Jones, Alison & Sufrin, Brenda, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 6th 
Edition, Oxford Competition Law 2016, p 951 f. 
6 Governed by Commission Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by 
the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18–
24, as amended by Commission Regulation 622/2008 on the conduct of settlement 
procedures in cartel cases, OJ L 171, 1.7.2008, p. 3–5. 
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to focus on the critique which has been delivered in the past few years, in 
order to keep my research more relevant and up to date.  
 
I have deliberately chosen to include more general positive aspects of the 
commitment procedure, at large based on the Commission’s own views and 
perspective. The reason for not including any specific positive reviews of the 
Alrosa and Morningstar rulings is that I do not find that would contribute to 
finding an answer to my final and most important research question, however 
interesting it might have been to include. As for the critical opinions I have 
chosen more specific assessments of the implications of especially Alrosa, as 
they provide information I deem to be useful in answering as well my second 
as my final research question. The critique is meant to be focused at the 
implications of the commitment procedure and its case law, which grants a 
wide margin of discretion to the Commission upon adopting commitment 
decisions. The positive remarks are directed at the commitment procedure as 
an instrument of enforcement of competition law. 
 
1.3 Research Method and Perspective 
The essay contains to some extent more descriptive parts, as a way of 
providing for the necessary information regarding the importance of 
competition law within the EU, as well as the relevant legal provisions and 
documents. The two case stemming from the EU Courts which to a certain 
extent form the basis for my analysis are also laid out in a more descriptive 
manner. For these more descriptive sections the legal doctrinal method (or 
‘legal dogmatics’) proves a helpful and suitable method. Legal dogmatics 
include the inquiry into the law as it is (de lege lata), as well as the possibility 
to express an opinion of how the law should be (de lege ferenda). The method 
is not only used to discover existing law but also functions as a means to 
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assess it.7 The legal doctrical method pursues knowledge of the present law, 
while at the same time providing for a further evaluation of it.8 The method 
provides a means as to understand the universally recognised sources of law, 
such as legislation and preparatory work, as well as case law and relevant 
legal doctrine.9 
 
As this essay is written from an EU law perspective, the EU legal method 
must also be considered. The method establishes the hierarchy of norms and 
general principles within the EU legal system. The superior norm consists of 
primary law, such as the founding Treaties TEU and TFEU. Secondary law 
consists of legal documents such as regulations, which are directly applicable 
in all EU Member States, and directives, which are binding upon Member 
States as to the results they aim to achieve.10 The case law of the CJEU is 
considered a valuable source of guidance as to how EU legislation and 
principles are to be understood, and at times jurisprudence developed 
primarily by the ECJ may evolve into highly valued general principles of 
law.11 Case law stemming from the ECJ holds the highest precedential value 
followed by jurisprudence from the GC. Subordinated sources to the case law 
of the EU Courts include Opinions by the Advocate Generals as well as legal 
doctrine.12 Due to the principle of supremacy, EU law prevails over the 
national law of a Member State if a conflict between the two were to arise.13  
 
                                                
7 Eng, Svein, Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 
‘Descriptive Proposition’ and ‘Normative Proposition’ as Concepts of Degree, Ratio Juris 
Issue 3, 2000, pp 236-260. 
8 Stelmach, Jerzy & Brozek, Bartosz, Methods of legal reasoning, Springer, 2006, pp 17 ff. 
9 Fredric Korling & Mauro Zamboni, Juridisk metodlära, Studentlitteratur, 2013, pp 21 ff.  
10 Article 288 TFEU. 
11 See e.g. case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 & case 106/77 Simmenthal S.p.A. 
vs Amministrazione Delle Finanze pello Stato, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49 for jurisprudence on the 
principle on the supremacy of EU law. 
12 Jörgen Hettne & Ida Otken-Eriksson, EU-rättslig metod – teori och genomslag i svensk 
rättstillämpning, 2nd Edition, Norstedts Juridik, 2011, pp 40 ff; p 188 f. 
13 Craig, Paul and De Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law: text, cases, and materials, 6th Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2015, p. 267. 
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1.4 Materials  
As this essay centres around the commitment procedure available under EU 
competition law, the research is to a large extent based on EU materials. The 
primary EU legislation, Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), provide for the key EU 
competition law provisions, as well as some background to the interplay 
between the European Union and the area of competition law.  The piece of 
legislation at the centre of the research carried out in this essay is undeniably 
Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty, which constitutes secondary 
EU law. Other EU documents, mainly from the Commission, have proven 
useful as well, such as its 2014 Competition Policy Brief ’To Commit or Not 
to Commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitment’.14 
 
There is no lacking of literature in the field of EU competition law, meaning 
rather than having trouble finding material my challenge has been to select 
the works which would prove the most useful for my research. For the more 
introductory and descriptive parts of this essay the works of David Whish & 
Richard Bailey, and Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, have provided great help, 
as I find they present information in a well-structured and neutral manner, 
alerting the reader in the event of them taking a stand in a certain question. 
 
 In order to illustrate the positive aspects of the commitment procedure, the 
works of Professor Wouter Wils, mainly an article from 2015 where he draws 
on several previous articles he has written on the subject, is used, along with 
the Commission’s abovementioned Policy Brief. The presentation of critical 
views on the commitment procedure, and more specifically on the Alrosa 
jurisprudence, includes articles and papers by Professor Florian Wagner-von 
                                                
14 European Commission, To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and 
commitments, Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, ISBN 978-92-79-35543-1, 
ISSN: 2315-3113. 
Available via http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/003_en.pdf. 
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Papp, Professor Frederic Jenny, former Bruegel15 Research Fellow Mario 
Mariniello, and the duo Damien Geradin & Evi Mattioli. In selecting these 
authors my goal has been to provide for an assortment of interesting aspects 
and outlooks regarding the possible dangers of the commitment procedure in 
light of the Alrosa and Morningstar rulings. Upon choosing which critique to 
present I have aimed at such which relates to the broad margin of discretion 
granted to the Commission in Alrosa, in order for the opinions shown to best 
help answer my second research question. 
 
The Alrosa and Morningstar rulings themselves are accounted for in some 
detail. I have found this to be of importance as a somewhat more detailed 
description of the circumstances leading up to the Commission decisions, as 
well as an accounting of the arguments of the parties before the courts, is 
needed for an adequate following analysis. I want to display the differences 
in scenario, and yet the similarity in the Courts’ reasoning to the effect of 
proportionality and the Commission’s discretional powers.  
 
1.5 Outline and Disposition  
This essay is divided into six main chapters. Chapter two provides for an 
introduction to EU competition law, and the role of the Commission and EU 
Courts in competition law enforcement. The second chapter also presents the 
main features of Regulation 1/2003. Chapter three focuses completely on 
Article 9 of the regulation, and explains the success of the commitment 
procedure, comparing this enforcement model to what was available under 
the previous governing regulation, Regulation 17, pertaining to commitments. 
The fourth chapter presents the case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa; the 
Commission Decision, GC ruling and ECJ ruling. 
                                                
15 An independent European think tank that specialises in economics, website: 
http://bruegel.org 
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Chapter five depicts critique regarding the implications of the commitment 
procedure and the Alrosa jurisprudence, as well as what possible detriments 
this may bring with respect to legal certainty, predictability and an adequate 
level of judicial review. The chapter also presents the more recent case ruled 
upon by the GC in 2016, T-76/14 Morningstar v Commission. The final 
chapter provides for an analysis of the implications of Alrosa and 
Morningstar as regards third party challenges to commitment decisions. The 
final chapter also develops on the limitation of the possibility for judicial 
review of commitment decisions, and offers some concluding remarks.  
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2 Introduction to EU 
Competition Law and 
Regulation 1/2003 
 
As of 1 December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the 
European Community (EC) gave way for the European Union (EU). The 
European Union is established by the EU Treaties, commonly referred to as 
‘the Treaties’, consisting of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Through them, the 
currently 28 Member States limit their own state sovereignty by conferring 
certain competences to the EU.  
 
Through the competences bestowed upon it, the Union can act in order to 
ensure the fulfilment of its objectives.16 Amongst these objectives is the 
establishment of an internal market, which shall work for a highly competitive 
social market economy.17 A large portion of EU law is aimed at eliminating 
possible obstacles to free movement, and promoting competition within the 
Union.18 Hence it is safe to claim that competition law is an important part of 
present-day EU law. However, it is clear that establishing its own competition 
policy has been of importance to the EU since the Treaty of Rome entered 
into force in 1957. The treaty introduced that “the activities of the Community 
shall include … the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted”.19 Since Lisbon the overarching aim of 
undistorted competition in the internal market can be found in  Protocol 2720 
annexed to the Treaties. Having the same force as any Treaty provision21, the 
                                                
16 Article 5(2) TEU. 
17 Article 3(3) TEU. 
18 Whish, Richard & Bailey, David, Competition Law, 8th Edition, Oxford Competition Law, 
2015, pp 52 f; Craig, & de Búrca, pp 1001 f. 
19 Article 3(f), the Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957, renumbered to Article 3(g) through the 
Treaty of Maastricht, 1 November 1993 and 3(1)(g) through the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1 May 
1999. 
20 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 309–309. 
21 Article 51 TEU. 
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Protocol states that the establishment of an internal market as set out in Article 
3 TEU includes creating a system ensuring that competition is not distorted. 
In Article 3(1)(b) TFEU “the establishing of the competition rules necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market” is listed as one of the areas in which 
the Union has exclusive competence. 
 
The current EU rules on competition can be found in Articles 101-109 TFEU, 
with the two main provision in Articles 101 and 102, along with the EU 
Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’)22. 
 
2.1 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
The key EU competition law provisions are rather broadly drafted. They aim 
to guard against anti-competitive agreements between undertakings23  and the 
abuse of a dominant position on a specific market24. 
 
Article 101(1) TFEU bars anti-competitive agreements25; meaning 
agreements between undertakings that restrict competition — the classic 
example being a cartel, on both horizontal and vertical levels, between 
undertakings. Article 101(3) provides for an exception which may declare 
Article 101(1) inapplicable if an agreement fulfils certain conditions. 
 
Article 102 prohibits the abuse by a dominant undertaking of its own 
dominant position and reads as follows: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
                                                
22 Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 
L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1–22. 
23 Article 101 TFEU. 
24 Article 102 TFEU. 
25 The term here includes the notions of “decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices” as are also prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
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prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States.  Such abuse may, in 
particular, consist in:  
 
(a)  directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions;  
(b)  limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;  
(c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage;  
(d)  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.  
 
Being dominant on a market is not a crime in itself, however there are certain 
actions you must refrain from in order not to abuse your position and hence 
breach Article 102 TFEU.  Interesting to note is that these actions might have 
been allowed had the undertaking been smaller.26  
 
2.2 The Role of the Commission and 
the EU Courts 
The Commission is the EU institution at the centre of EU competition law.27 
It is the main enforcer of the competition rules on an EU level, and it also 
plays a very central part in the development of competition law.28 The powers 
                                                
26 Rose, Vivien, & Bailey, David, Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of Competition, 
Oxford Competition Law, 7th Edition, 2013, p 752. 
27 Article 17(1) TEU; see also Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:689, para 46. 
28 Whish & Bailey, p 94. 
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of the Commission and the rules regarding public enforcement of EU 
competition law are stipulated in more detail in Regulation 1/2003. 
 
However, the Commission does not have unlimited power as its decisions can 
be submitted for appeal. Such an appeal will come first before the General 
Court, which will review the decision in accordance with the relevant 
provisions in TFEU.29 The GC has the power to review a decision both on 
points of law and on points of fact, meaning the Court is able to assess 
evidence, annul a contested decision and alter the amount of a fine.30 
Generally, individuals (natural or legal persons) have a much harder time 
bringing a challenge before the GC compared to a Member State or an EU 
Institution. Article 263 TFEU reads: “Any natural or legal person may … 
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of 
direct and individual concern to them…”, meaning you need to be both 
directly and individually affected by a Commission decision in order to 
successfully ask the GC to review the legality of it. A decision from the 
General Court can in turn be appealed to the Court of Justice on points of law 
only.31  The Court has a strict view of what falls within this scope, and has 
repeated that it does not review any factual circumstances.32 
 
2.3 Regulation 1/2003 
Playing an important part in the modernisation process of EU competition 
law, Regulation 1/200333 governs the public enforcement procedure acted out 
by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities (NCAs)  as 
regards infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Regulation 
                                                
29 Article 256 (1) TFEU. 
30 Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:815, para 67. 
31  Article 58, Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p 
210-229; Codified version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, OJ C 177, 
2.1.2010. 
32 Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1999:358, para 58; Case C-551/03 
P General Motors BV v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, paras 50–51. 
33 OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25. 
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substituted the previously applicable Council Regulation 17.34 The 
Regulation’s main features are the establishment of direct effect of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, the decentralisation of public enforcement, along with 
the principle of cooperation and uniform application of EU competition law.35 
The Regulation also removed the possibility for undertakings of obtaining 
negative clearance, an establishing that there has not been an infringement of 
competition law.36  
 
2.4 Decentralised Enforcement 
The modernisation of EU competition law under Regulation 1/2003 
‘decentralised’ the enforcement of the competition law provisions, meaning 
that along with the Commission NCAs and national courts now have 
competence to apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU.37 On the subject of 
commitment decisions recital 13 of the Regulation states “Commitment 
decisions should find that there are no longer grounds for action by the 
Commission without concluding whether or not there has been or still is an 
infringement. Commitment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to make such a 
finding and decide upon the case.” Recital 22 adds that “Commitment 
decisions adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of the courts 
and the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty.”  
 
However, it is important to notice that if the Commission initiates proceedings 
NCAs are relieved from their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102, and 
thus cannot take action under the same legal basis against the same 
undertakings(s) on the same relevant geographic and product market 
                                                
34 Council Regulation No 17, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204–211. 
35 Nazzini, Renato, Competition Enforcement and Procedure, Oxford Competition Law, 2nd 
Edition, 2016, p 8. 
36 This possibility was previously available under Article 2 of Regulation 17.  
37 For NCAs, Article 5 Reg 1/2003, for national courts, Article 6 Reg 1/2003. 
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regarding the same agreement(s) or practice(s).38 For the sake of uniformity, 
Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 states that in a matter where the Commission 
has already adopted a decision, a national court may not deliver a ruling 
running counter to that decision.39 Same goes for NCAs in their decision 
making.40 This showcases that despite the decentralisation of public 
competition law enforcement, the Commission has still wanted to maintain 
its key role in the legal area as a guardian of the Treaty, being ultimately 
responsible for developing policy and the safeguarding of consistency when 
it comes to the application of EU competition law.41 This also raises the 
question whether national courts and NCAs have any de facto  power in e.g. 
delivering a ruling based on a separate private claim against an undertaking, 
where the Commission has already adopted a commitment decision towards 
that same undertaking.  
 
2.5 Powers of the Commission 
Article 4 of Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission shall have the 
powers provided for by the Regulation for the purpose of applying Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. The powers provided are included mainly in Chapters III, 
V and VI of the Regulation.  
 
The Commission’s powers of investigation into a suspected infringement are 
rather broad, and include inter alia requesting information42, inspecting 
premises43 and taking statements44. These powers are contained in Chapter V, 
Articles 17-22.  
                                                
38 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 
101, 27.4.2004, p. 43–53, (NCA Cooperation Notice) para. 51. 
39 Article 16(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
40 Ibid, Article 16(2). 
41 NCA Cooperation Notice, para. 43. 
42 Article 18, Regulation 1/2003. 
43 Ibid, Article 20(2)(a). 
44 Ibid, Article 19. 
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The powers to impose penalties are provided by Chapter VI. Article 23 grants 
the Commission a right to impose fines on undertakings, for both procedural45 
and substantive infringements46. Substantive infringements are breaches of 
Articles 101(1) or 102 TFEU which have led to the adoption of an 
infringement decision under Article 747, and breaches of Commission 
decisions, such as the failure to comply with a commitment decision under 
Article 9 of the Regulation48. Such a fine can amount to as much as 10 per 
cent of an undertaking’s worldwide turnover in the previous business year.49 
Article 23(3) requires the Commission to take regard to both the gravity as 
well as to the duration of the infringement,  but in practice the Commission 
holds a wide margin of appreciation when determining the amount of a fine.50  
The discretional powers of the Commission will be developed on further in 
the context of adopting commitment decisions, however it is interesting to 
note that this permeates many aspects of EU competition law. In addition to 
a fine, the Commission may burden an undertaking with periodic penalty 
payments, e.g. for failing to comply with a Commission decision.51 These 
may amount to a maximum of 5 % of the average daily turnover. 
 
Details on the conduct of proceedings by the Commission can be found in 
Regulation 773/200452, however describing the process is not within the 
scope of this essay. 
 
 
                                                
45 Article 23(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
46 Ibid, Article 23(2). 
47 Ibid, Article 23(2)(a). 
48 Ibid, Article 23(2)(c). 
49 Ibid, Article 23(2). 
50 Cases C-189/02 P etc Dansk Rørindustri A/S v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, para 
172; Whish & Bailey, p 292. 
51 Article 24, Regulation 1/2003. 
52 OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18–24. 
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2.6 Article 7 – Infringement Decisions 
As one of two main provisions under Chapter III, Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003 states in its first paragraph that: 
 
Where the Commission… finds that there is an infringement of 
Article [101] or of Article [102] of the Treaty, it may by decision 
require the undertakings and associations of undertakings 
concerned to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it 
may impose on them any behavioural or structural remedies which 
are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to 
bring the infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can 
only be imposed either where there is no equally effective 
behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural 
remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned 
than the structural remedy. 
 
The Commission can hence, if an infringement is found, adopt what is called 
an infringement decision, establishing that an infringement has been found 
and including remedies to put that infringement to an end. There are chiefly 
two types of remedies available for use in order to bring a competition law 
infringement to an end: behavioural and structural. Generally, behavioural 
remedies are considered less severe than structural and are thus preferred as 
a primary course of action.  
 
Behavioural remedies concern, as the name may give away, remedies relating 
to an undertaking’s behaviour. They can be positive – providing an obligation 
to do something, or negative – demanding a certain type of conduct or 
behaviour to seize.53 The power and ability to adopt a decision including 
structural remedies, i.e. ordering changes to the structure of an undertaking, 
is a very powerful instrument in the Commission’s toolbox. As is shown 
                                                
53 Whish & Bailey, p 266. 
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above Article 7(1) states a structural remedy is only to be resorted to if there 
is no equally effective behavioural one, or if a behavioural remedy would 
prove more burdensome for the undertaking compared to a structural one. No 
structural remedies have been imposed by the Commission under Article 7 
yet54, however there are a number of cases where structural commitments 
have been offered by undertakings under Article 9 of the regulation55, 
particularly following the Commission’s investigation of the energy sector56.  
 
                                                
54 Whish & Bailey p 267; Jones & Sufrin, p 945. 
55 Whish & Bailey, p 274 f. 
56 Whish & Bailey, p 267; See European Commission, Report of the Sector Inquiry on 
Capacity Mechanisms Brussels, 30.11.2016, COM (2016) 752 final. 
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3 Article 9: Commitment 
Decisions 
 
If the Commission intends to adopt a decision under Article 7 requiring an 
infringement of Article 101(1) or 102 TFEU to come to an end, the 
undertakings concerned by that decision, since the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003, now have the possibility of offering commitments to meet 
the Commission’s concerns.57 Article 9(1) reads: 
 
Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that 
an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings 
concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to 
them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the 
Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on 
the undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified 
period and shall conclude that there are no longer grounds for 
action by the Commission. 
 
As is displayed, for Article 9 to be applicable the Commission needs to have 
the intention towards adopting an infringement decision under Article 7. 
However it does not have to have carried out a full assessment of the 
behaviour of the undertakings concerned, rather just made a ‘preliminary 
assessment’ of the situation.58 This means an undertaking wanting to offer 
commitments should do so early on in the Commission’s investigation 
process.  
 
Commitments under Article 9 can include both behavioural and structural 
remedies, and are offered before the Commission has actually made a finding 
                                                
57 Article 9(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
58 Ibid. For more detailed info on the procedure see Commission Notice on best practices for 
the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Notice on Best 
Practices), OJ C 308, 20.10.2011, p. 6–32, paras, 115–133. 
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of infringement under Article 7 and decided on suitable remedies.59 
Accordingly, a commitment offered by an undertaking may entail obligations 
which go beyond what the Commission would have been able to impose.60 
The ECJ has developed on the reason for this, and why the Commission 
should be allowed to adopt decisions based on commitments which can be 
more burdensome for an undertaking than what the Commission could have 
decided under Article 7, in the case Commission v Alrosa61. According to the 
Court, there is a difference between a decision adopted under Article 9 and 
one adopted under Article 7. Whilst the purpose of Article 7 is to bring an 
infringement to a stop, commitments under Article 9 are offered with the 
intention of meeting the concerns the Commission has discovered following 
its preliminary assessment.62 The measures which can be imposed under 
Article 7 and Article 9 thus, in the ECJ’s view, do not have to be comparable 
in the same situation.63 Undertakings may accordingly offer, and the 
Commission is allowed to accept, commitments under Article 9 which go 
beyond what the Commission could impose under Article 7.64  
 
In a case where the Commission finds that the commitments which have been 
offered to them by an undertaking meet it concerns, and is willing to accept 
them, the commitments are put out for a so-called market test as is stipulated 
in Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003. The commitments are published in the 
EU’s  Official Journal65 and third parties are invited to comment on them.66 
If the Commission finds, after the market test has been conducted, that the 
commitments offered are not enough to address the competition concerns at 
hand, it will notify the undertakings concerned. If they are in turn willing to 
amend their commitments the amended commitments will be sent out for 
another market test. However if they are not the Commission may revert to a 
                                                
59 Jones & Sufrin, p 946. 
60 Jones & Sufrin, p 946; Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa, paras 48-50. 
61 Case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa. 
62 Ibid, para 46. 
63 Ibid, para 47. 
64 Ibid, paras 48-50. 
65 The Official Journal of the European Union, commonly referred to as "the OJ", is the 
official gazette of the EU and the formal source of EU legislative information. 
66 Notice on Best Practices, paras. 129–133. 
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procedure under Article 7 instead.67 If the Commission finds that 
commitments which have been offered do meet its concerns regarding the 
legality of an agreement or behaviour, the Commission may adopt a decision 
under Article 9 binding the undertakings concerned to their commitments.68 
 
This possibility for the Commission of formally accepting commitments from 
undertakings and turning them into a binding decision is as mentioned new 
under Regulation 1/2003.69  The rationale behind opening up for this 
possibility is a very practical one: saving the Commission’s limited resources 
and lessening its heavy work-load.70 A procedure under Article 9 can be more 
efficient than one under Article 7 since there are not as many procedural steps 
required. Utilising the Article 9 procedure in suitable cases can be a very 
effective way of addressing certain competition concerns, as it allows for 
more rapid solutions than infringement decisions do.71 This helps ease the 
Commission’s burden a great deal. However, it is worth to note that the GC 
has stated that Commission is never under any obligation to accept 
commitments offered under Article 9 instead of reverting to a procedure 
under Article 7 and a finding of infringement.72 What else is noteworthy is 
that Article 9(2) allows the Commission to reopen the proceedings against  
the undertakings in cases 
 
(a)  where there has been a material change in any of the facts on 
which the decision was based; 
(b)  where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their 
commitments; or 
(c)  where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or 
misleading information provided by the parties. 
 
                                                
67 Notice on Best Practices, para 133. 
68 Article 9(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
69 Jones & Sufrin, p 945. 
70 Whish & Bailey, p 268. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:220, para 130. 
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If an Article 9 decision is breached by the undertakings conerned, the 
Commission may adopt a decision imposing a fine under Article 23(2)(c) of 
Regulation 1/2003. 
 
The regulation itself really only sets one limitation to when the use of Article 
9 might not be appropriate to address competition concerns the Commission 
might have. Recital 13 states that commitment decisions are not appropriate 
in a case where the Commission intends to impose a fine. Thus, in cases of 
cartels73 Article 9 is not available for use.74 The Commission has also stated 
that neither should a commitment decision under Article 9 be an option in 
cases where the prime goal is to penalise past behaviour, rather it should be 
used mainly as a method of adjusting future behaviour.75 Whereas Article 9 
has not been used in cases of hard core cartels, the Commission has accepted 
commitments in a number of cases where its competition concerns regarded 
Article 102, and where, if proven, the infringements were severe enough to 
have amounted to serious fines.76 This raises the question of whether the 
possibility of solving a competition concern under Article 9 is perhaps being 
used more than was intended when Regulation 1/2003 came into force in 
2004. 
 
                                                
73 As defined in paragraph 1 of the Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction 
of fines in cartel cases, (Leniency Notice) OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17–22. 
74 Notice on Best Practices, para 116; Wils, Wouter P. J., Ten Years of Commitment Decisions 
Under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: Too Much of a Good Thing? (June 12, 2015). 
Concurrences Journal 6th International Conference 'New frontiers of antitrust' (Paris, 15 June 
2015), p 3. Available via SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2617580. In 2008 the Commission 
created a specific settlement procedure for cartel cases.  
75 To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments, Competition 
Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p 4. 
76 Jones & Sufrin, p 945; Commission Decision of 9.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the 
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/38.636 – RAMBUS). 
Commission Decision of 6.3.2013 addressed to Microsoft Corporation relating to a 
proceeding on the imposition of a fine pursuant to Article 23(2)(c) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 for failure to comply with a commitment made binding by a Commission 
decision pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (Case AT.39530 – 
Microsoft (Tying)).; Commission Decision of 13.12.2011 addressed to International Business 
Machines Corporation 2009 relating to proceedings under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-
3/39692, IBM Maintenance Services). 
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3.1 The success of the commitment 
procedure under Article 9 
This section aims to provide an answer to the first research question posed, 
by elaborating on the positive aspects of the commitment procedure and the 
possibility given to the Commission to adopt decisions making commitments 
binding upon undertakings. 
  
In my opinion, the Court of Justice summarises the enforcement procedure 
under Article 9 quit well in Alrosa. It "is a new mechanism introduced by 
Regulation No 1/2003 which is intended to ensure that the competition rules 
laid down in the Treaty are applied effectively, by means of the adoption of 
decisions making commitments, proposed by the parties and considered 
appropriate by the Commission, binding in order to provide a more rapid 
solution to the competition problems identified by the Commission, instead 
of proceeding by making a formal finding of an infringement. More 
particularly, Article 9 of the regulation is based on considerations of 
procedural economy, and enables [undertakings] to participate fully in the 
procedure, by putting forward the solutions which appear to them to be the 
most appropriate and capable of addressing the Commission's concerns" 77 
 
Since the procedure under Article 9 was made available it has become a well-
used one. Aside from in cartel scenarios, accepting commitments has become 
the most common way for the Commission to deal with cases where it has 
identified competition concerns. According to the Commission’s own 
Competition Policy Brief, between May 2004 and December 2013 the 
Commission adopted 33 commitment decisions under Article 9.78 During that 
same period, 19 decisions establishing an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 
                                                
77 C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa, para 35. 
78 See statistics presented in To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and 
commitments, Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p 3. 
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TFEU were adopted under Article 7, excluding cartel cases.79 Perhaps it is 
not too difficult to guess why undertakings may prefer a procedure where they 
themselves may participate more actively and suggest amendments, but 
undoubtedly there are more aspects to consider. The Commission has 
identified numerous advantages commitment decisions can have over 
infringement/prohibition decisions.80 
 
Firstly, using Article 9 is likely to result in a swifter resolution of the 
competition concerns at hand, which in turn leads to a quicker market impact.  
This corresponds well with the the regulation’s main objective, namely to 
ensure the effective application of the competition rules laid down under the 
Treaty.81 The earlier on commitments are offered the more meaningful are the 
procedural gains. This is especially essential if the relevant market affected 
by the agreement/behaviour is fast-moving, such as the IT sector, where 
addressing competition concerns as rapidly and as effectively as possible is 
vital.82 For reasons of procedural economy, the Commission limits its 
assessment under Article 9 to a preliminary one. A key feature of the 
commitment procedure is that the Commission must not carry out such an in-
depth assessment as to be able to make a finding as to whether Article 101 or 
102 TFEU has been infringed.83 
 
Secondly, the remedies under Article 9 are believed by the Commission to be 
more effective. Even though the remedies available when adopting a decision 
under Article 7 and 9 are the same, there is one key difference. As mentioned 
above, the main goal of Article 7 is to put an end to an infringement, meaning 
the remedies will be ones which prohibit and sanction infringements which 
have already happened, and may be on-going. Of course, the goal of Article 
                                                
79 See statistics presented in To Commit or Not to Commit? Deciding between prohibition 
and commitments Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p 3. 
80 See To Commit or Not to Commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments 
Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014. 
81 Recital 5; Recital 6 Regulation 1/2003. 
82 Ibid, p 2. 
83 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 14 September 2017 in Case C-547/16 
Gasorba SL and Others v Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:692, para 32. 
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9 is to address any competition concerns the Commission may have, but 
commitment decisions also have a more forward-looking perspective than 
infringement decisions.84 An undertaking offering commitments will commit 
to behaving in a specific way, for a specified duration of time, and often that  
behaviour can go beyond abiding by legislation, or even include structural 
remedies which can have a long-lasting effect on the relevant market. It is the 
view of the Commission that commitments may be more suitable in avoiding 
a recurrence of competition concerns, in comparison to the deterrent effect a 
fine can have.85 
 
In addition, the Commissions states that measures adopted through 
commitment decisions are implemented both faster and better. As it is the 
undertakings themselves who propose the commitments, implementation is 
simplified, whilst the risk of obtaining a fine for violating a commitment 
decision provides incentive enough to implement them correctly.86 Another 
interesting potential motivator for the Commission, which is developed on 
under chapter 5, is that due to limitations to the possibility for judicial review, 
the Commission may, through the use of commitment decisions, resolve 
competition concerns as it sees fit in cases raising novel questions as concerns 
the interpretation and use of the EU competition law provisions, with a much 
limited risk of that decision being challenged before the General Court.87 
 
Lastly, there are definitely a few advantages to be won for the undertakings 
under investigation if they choose to offer commitments, the most obvious 
being they get to have an actual input into which remedy will be used to 
address the competition concerns in their case. The entire procedure is less 
burdensome, especially if commitments are offered early on in the process. 
                                                
84 To Commit or Not to Commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments 
Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p 2f. 
85 To Commit or Not to Commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments 
Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014, p 2f. 
86 Ibid, p 3. 
87 De la Mano, Miguel, Nazzini, Renato & Zenger, Hans, Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of 
Competition, Eds Faull, Jonathan, Nikpay, Ali, & Taylor, Deirdre (Assistant Editor), 3rd 
Edition, Oxford Competition Law, 2014, p 342. 
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Avoiding the Commission commencing investigations under Article 7 can 
save a lot of time which would otherwise have been spend in lengthy 
proceedings.88 Additionally, undertakings avoid being fined when subject to 
a commitment decision, unless they fail to comply with the commitments.89 
This differs from an infringement decision under Article 7 as the Commission 
may adopt a fine directly if they find Article 101 or 102 has been 
infringed.90As a commitment decision does not actually involve a finding of 
infringement91, it cannot be the basis of private enforcement in the form of 
follow-on actions by private parties in of a national court92, and undertakings 
subject to a commitment decision rather than an infringement decision stand 
less of a risk incurring a bad reputation93. As a result of all the above-
mentioned, commitments have been regarded as a “win-win” solution for 
both undertakings and the Commission.94  
 
A vast amount of the cases which have been dealt with under Article 9 have 
been suspected infringements of Article 102 TFEU, rather than Article 101.95 
Because of the lack of possibility to apply Article 9 in cases of hard-core 
cartels this is not surprising. Richard Whish and David Bailey add to this that 
a more negotiated outcome in Article 102 cases is beneficial to both the 
Commission and the undertakings subject to suspected infringement. As these 
types of cases are usually more complex than cartels, an outcome which 
satisfies the Commission’s competition concern and at the same time does not 
                                                
88 To Commit or Not to Commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments 
Competition Policy Brief, Issue 3, March 2014. 
89 Article 23(2)(c) Regulation 1/2003. 
90 Article 23 (2)(a) Regulation 1/2003. 
91 Gautier, Alex & Petit, Nicolas, Optimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The 
Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty, April 24, 2015, p 2. Available via SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509729. 
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include an actual finding of an infringement on the part of the undertaking, 
can often be a welcome solution.96  
 
Regulation 1/2003 formally offers dominant undertakings another possibility 
following an investigation into their behaviour than either being subject to an 
infringement decision or obtaining negative clearance. Undertakings 
concerned about potentially infringing Article 101(1) used to have the 
possibility of being granted an individual exemption under Regulation 1797 
but no such option was available to dominant firms. Officially introducing a 
possibility for dominant undertakings to alter their behaviour and accordingly 
avoid an infringement decision is of course an attractive option. However, 
claiming that all cases decided under Article 9 would, if the possibility to 
adopt commitment decisions had not been introduced, instead have been the 
subject of a full-on investigation under Article 7 is probably not true. The 
following section shows why. 
3.1.1 Commitments under Regulation 17  
As mentioned the possibility to make commitments binding upon 
undertakings was formally introduced with Regulation 1/2003. There seems 
to be be a quite broad consensus that the option has been used more than was 
anticipated and perhaps more than it should be.98 Yet, even before the entry 
into force of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission would accept commitments 
from undertakings in cases of suspected competition infringement. However, 
at the time the Commission was without any possibility to make these 
commitments binding.99 Professor and Hearing Officer for competition 
proceedings at the European Commission Wils Wouter, has compiled 
information on competition law cases from before the implementation of 
Regulation 1/2003.100  
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In non-cartel cases under Article 101, the Commission adopted 8 prohibition 
decisions, and granted exemptions or negative clearance in 18 cases, of which 
14 were following commitments, between the years 2000 and 2003.101 The 
statistics Wils displays do however not entail the many cases under both 
Articles 101 and 102 which were closed following commitments, and where 
no formal decisions were published.102 As Regulation 17 did not offer the 
possibility under Article 102 of obtaining a formal  decision establishing an 
individual exemption, whether that decision relied upon commitments or not, 
the vast majority of cases which were solved through the offering of 
commitments under Article 102 were simply closed. Thus, a compilation of 
cases regarding suspected infringements of Article 102 where commitments 
were offered and accepted is not included in Wils’ paper.103 However, 
research by Professor Laurence Idot104 has shown that in 1997 six out of seven 
investigation into infringements of Article 102 were closed following 
commitments.105 In the Commission’s report from the same year, it stated, 
regarding undertakings in a dominant position:   
 
“As far as proceedings are concerned, the Commission ultimately imposed 
fines in only one case this year. In the remainder, it was able, after the 
complaint-notification stage, to accept from the undertakings involved 
commitments or changes to agreements which put an end to the offending 
practices. The attitude of undertakings reveals a genuine willingness to 
accept the principles of competition, but the approach must not be relaxed in 
future. This is why the Commission will continue to see that proposed 
commitments are honoured.”106 
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Drawing on all this, Wils claims it seems that under Regulation 17 non-cartel 
infringements, under both Articles 101 and 102, were more often than not 
closed following commitments, rather than through infringement 
decisions.107 The percentage difference between how many cases were solved 
through commitments before and after the entry into force of Regulation 
1/2003 is probably not very high, if there even is one.108 However, the most 
important difference is that since 2004 there is a way of actually enforcing 
compliance with commitments. Instead of closing a case informally the 
Commission adopts a formal commitment decision under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003, and not complying can result in fines or periodic penalty 
payments.109 Formalising the commitment procedure has also, in Wils’ view 
helped improve the quality of the commitments, and their effectiveness, due 
to the market testing stage as well as improved means of enforcement.110  
 
In my view, Article 9 is a great compliment to Article 7, especially since it 
formalized and made official a procedure which was previously not 
enforceable.  However, the procedure has received plenty critique, especially 
so after the ruling in Alrosa. The following chapter presents the case. 
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4 C- 441/ 07 P Commission v 
Alrosa 
 
In December 2001 the two companies De Beers111 and Alrosa112 entered into 
an agreement. The agreement concerned the supply by Alrosa to De Beers of 
rough diamonds to a value of USD 800 million per year over a period of five 
years.113 The agreement was a part of a long-standing trading relationship 
between the two undertakings. The two notified the agreement to the 
Commission in 2002, hoping to obtain the negative clearance that was at the 
time still available under Regulation17 as regards the agreement’s 
compliance with Article 81 EC, today’s Article 101 TFEU.114 
 
It is noteworthy that De Beers was the largest diamond mining company in 
the world, active in the entire process from the exploration and mining for 
diamonds all the way to jewellery sales, thus covering basically the entire 
diamond pipeline.115 Alrosa on its hand held 98% of the diamond production 
in Russia, the second largest diamond producing country in the world in 
value, making the company the second largest diamond mining company and 
diamond producer worldwide.116 
 
4.1 The Commission Decision 
In the beginning of 2003 the Commission sent a statement of objections to 
Alrosa and De Beers stating that the agreement could not be granted negative 
clearance and be exempted under Article 81(3) EC, but was capable of 
                                                
111 De Beers société anonyme, incorporated in Luxembourg, a holding company of the De 
Beers Group of companies.  
112 ALROSA Company Limited.  
113 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 
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constituting such an anti-competitive agreement which was prohibited by 
Article 81 EC.117 At the same time a separate statement of objections was sent 
to De Beers alone where the Commission expressed its concern that the 
agreement was also at risk of constituting an abuse of a dominant position and 
breaching Article 82 EC, today’s Article 102 TFEU.118 
 
In December 2004 Alrosa and De Beers submitted to the Commission joint 
commitments with the hopes of meeting the competition concerns expressed 
by the Commission.119 The commitments proposed that the value in sales of 
rough diamonds by Alrosa to De Beers was to gradually be reduced, from 
USD 700 million in 2005 to USD 275 million in 2010, and were thereinafter 
to remain at that level.120 The Commission put out the commitments for a  
market test, in accordance with Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003. 21 parties 
submitted observations to the Commission, mainly diamond manufacturers 
and traders. The majority of the interested third parties not only confirmed 
the Commission’s competition concerns but also claimed that the 
commitments offered would not be sufficient in addressing the concerns.121  
Subsequently the Commission proposed the commitments should be 
amended, and in October 2005 it provided Alrosa and De Beers with an 
opportunity to submit new joint commitments, with intentions of  terminating 
the trading relationship with one another as of 2009, before the end of 
November 2005.122 No such commitments were received by the Commission 
in time. 
 
In early 2006 De Beers decided to individually submit amended 
commitments. In these commitments De Beers undertook to decrease its 
purchasing of rough diamonds from Alrosa, from a value of USD 600 million 
in 2006 to USD 400 million in 2008. After this period the purchasing would 
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seize completely as of the beginning of 2009, as the Commission had 
suggested.123 Upon receiving these amendments the Commission made a 
preliminary assessment of the situation, taking into account its own 
investigation and concerns, as well as the concerns submitted by third parties. 
The Commission proceeded to adopt a decision making the newly offered 
commitments binding upon De Beers in accordance with Article 9(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003.124  
 
The Commission’s main competition concern was the agreement’s sustaining 
or possibly even strengthening of De Beer’s dominant position. As the 
world’s second largest diamond producer would be hindered from fully 
competing with the largest one, potential customers would lose an alternate 
source of supply as a result.125 Through De Beers’ commitments, the portion 
of diamonds which Alrosa would have sold to De Beers had the agreement 
between the two undertakings withstood, would be freed up for others to buy.  
This, in the view of the Commission, was enough to “address the concern of 
reducing access to a viable source of alternative supply of rough diamonds 
and hindering the second biggest competitor from fully competing with De 
Beers.”126  
 
The amended commitments were offered to the Commission on January 25 
2006. The day after the Commission sent a copy of the proposed 
commitments to Alrosa, together with a copy of the non-confidential versions 
of the comments from third parties, and invited Alrosa to submit its 
observations.127 Alrosa provided observations to De Beers’ proposed 
commitments as well as the third party comments in a letter on February 6 
2006. 
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On February 22 the Commission adopted its decision, making the 
commitments offered by De Beers binding upon them128 and stating that the 
proceedings should be brought to an end.129  
 
4.2 The GC Ruling 
On June 29 2006 Alrosa brought an application for the annulment of the 
decision before the General Court. As stated above, Article 263 TFEU sets a 
high bar for private parties wanting to challenge EU acts. The GC did 
however find Alrosa to meet the established criteria, namely that of being of 
both directly and individually concerned by the contested decision.130  
4.2.1 Arguments of Alrosa 
In support of its application, Alrosa put forward three pleas in law131, alleging 
 
1. An infringement of the right to be heard; 
2. An infringement by the contested decision of Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003, which does not allow commitments to which an undertaking 
concerned has not voluntarily subscribed to be made binding on the 
undertaking, a fortiori for an indefinite period; 
3. The excessive nature of the commitments that were imposed, in breach of 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, Article 82 EC, the freedom of contract and 
the principle of proportionality. 
 
The Court began by assessing the second and third plea together.132 Alrosa 
claimed that since the Commission’s main competition concern regarded the 
trading relation between De Beers and Alrosa, the Commission should not 
                                                
128 COMP/B-2/38.381– De Beers, Article 1. 
129 COMP/B-2/38.381– De Beers, Article 2. 
130 T-170/06 Alrosa v Commission, paras 39-40 
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132 Ibid, para 43. 
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have been allowed to accept commitments coming from only De Beers. 
Alrosa argued that it should have been considered as an undertaking 
concerned under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Since the article aims to 
provide the Commission and the undertakings concerned with an opportunity 
of arriving at a mutually beneficial settlement, and joint commitments had 
been offered, Alrosa claimed only those commitments were allowed to be 
accepted and make binding by the Commission, however not commitments 
offered individually only by one of the concerned undertakings.133  
 
In addition, Alrosa interpreted the second sentence of Article 9134 to mean 
that the Commission is only allowed to adopt commitment decisions for a 
specified period, not for an indefinite period as was done.135 Thus the decision 
breached Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Further, Alrosa considered the 
decision to be in breach of Article 102 TFEU and the principle of contractual 
freedom, as it renders impossible, in absolute terms, any supply of rough 
diamonds to De Beers by Alrosa, for a potentially indefinite period.136 Article 
102, with an aim to capture the abuse of a dominant position, should not be 
interpreted as making it illegal to enter into a contract based on the ground 
that one of the parties is in a dominant position.137 Neither should it be 
allowed for the Commission to deprive Alrosa and De Beers of all freedom 
to enter into contracts with one another based on the fact that De Beers held 
a dominant position on the markets downstream from the market for the 
supply of rough diamonds.  
 
Alrosa estimated that had the jointly offered commitment been made binding, 
the notified agreement would only have covered 18% of Alrosa’s annual 
production and 3.6% of its annual worldwide sales of rough diamonds from 
2010 and onwards.138 All in all the competition concerns based on those 
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numbers did not justify the Commission’s decision, especially since it had the 
effect of removing Alrosa’s contractual freedom.139 Alrosa expressed concern 
that the Commission Decision was rather at risk of having anti-competitive 
effects itself as it deprived Alrosa of access to the market’s largest buyer, and 
as such allowed other purchasers to exercise greater market power in their 
negotiations with Alrosa, potentially imposing artificial prices.140  
 
Alrosa further claimed the Commission had breached the principle of 
proportionality when adopting its decision. Article 5 TEU establishes “the 
content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties”. This means where there is a choice 
between several measures, the choice should be the least onerous one, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.141 
Alrosa claimed this principle should apply to all decisions adopted under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, meaning the Commission should not be 
allowed to accept commitments that exceed what is necessary to ensure that 
competition on the internal market is not distorted.142 In the light of the 
objective of maintaining undistorted competition pursued by Article 102 
TFEU, Alrosa claimed the decision produced disproportionate effects, as it 
closed of any future possibility for Alrosa to enter into a contractual 
relationship with De Beers. The jointly proposed commitments, limiting 
Alrosa’s annual output and the share of worldwide output reserved to De 
Beers to 18% and 3.6%, respectively after 2010, would have been enough to 
address the concerns expressed by the Commission as to the risk of 
foreclosure of the market.143  
 
According to Alrosa, the disproportionate and discriminating nature of the 
decisions also came to show as other sellers were still able to sell rough 
diamonds to De Beers in quantitates larger than the 3,6% of of annual 
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worldwide production which Alrosa would have done had the agreement as 
amended by the jointly offered commitments been in place.144 
4.2.2 Arguments of the Commission 
The Commission contended all pleas put forward by Alrosa to be unfounded. 
As regards Alrosa’s status as an undertaking concerned it stated that only the 
party against whom proceedings have been initiated, in this case De Beers as 
the proceedings regarded an abuse of dominant position, can be regarded as 
such.145 Further the Commission stated that the second sentence of Article 9 
does not limit the Commission to merely adopting decisions for a specific 
period of time, rather it grants the Commission the power to do so.146  
 
The Commission denied that its decision infringed on Alrosa’s contractual 
freedom and had the effect of prohibiting lawful conduct.147 There are limits 
to the principle of contractual freedom, such as the prohibition of anti-
competitive behaviour established in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The 
agreement between Alrosa and De Beers, regarded in the context of the 
trading relationship between them, appeared to the Commission to breach 
those provisions.148 Not merely because De Beers was dominant on the 
downstream markets, but also due to its dominance on  the market for the 
production and supply of rough diamonds.149 Moreover, the Commission was 
of the opinion that its decision did not eliminate Alrosa’s freedom of contract 
as  the decision was only binding De Beers to the commitments it had 
proposed itself, within the scope of its own freedom of contract. In addition, 
the will of a partner of  tying itself to a dominant undertaking through an 
agreement should not have an effect on the application of Article 102 
TFEU.150 
                                                
144 T-170/06 Alrosa v Commission, para 64. 
145 Ibid, para 66. 
146 Ibid, para 67. 
147 Ibid, para 68. 
148 Ibid, para 69. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid, para 70. 
 43 
Alrosa’s claim that the Commission’s competition concerns did not justify 
the adoption of the commitments proposed by De Beers were further 
considered by the Commission to be incorrect.151 The Commission’s concerns 
“…were not limited to issues of the exclusion of competitors or foreclosure 
of the market. On the contrary, they extended to all the dealings between 
Alrosa and De Beers which sought jointly to regulate, by methods different 
from those consistent with normal competition, the volume, price and range 
of rough diamonds on the world market…”152. In addition, given the objective 
pursued by Article 9, the Commission had been lawfully entitled to accept the 
commitments proposed by De Beers.153 Alrosa’s expression of concern 
regarding the decision giving rise to anti-competitive effects were found by 
the Commission to be irrelevant and unsupported as it portrayed a false image 
of Alrosa as a supplier of De Beers rather than an actual competitor.154 
 
As regards the proposed breach of the principle of proportionality the 
Commission agreed that the principle is applicable to decisions under Article 
9 of Regulation No 1/2003.155 However, unlike Article 7, Article 9 does not 
demand the Commission establishes a competition infringement, but merely 
that there is no need for further action in order to address its competition 
concerns given the voluntarily offered commitments by the undertakings 
concerned.156 The specific nature of the provision must, was the 
Commission’s view, be taken into account.157 It agreed that commitments that 
are manifestly excessive must be rejected, on behalf of the principle of 
proportionality, however maintaining that since commitments are voluntarily 
offered by the undertakings concerned such a scenario would occur only 
exceptionally.158  In any case, the Commission found it could not be required 
to conduct a parallel assessment in order to arrive at a hypothetical decision 
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that could be adopted under Article 7, and compare this to the commitments 
offered, as this would undermine the whole purpose of Article 9 in terms of 
effectiveness.159 The judicial review of commitment decisions by the EU 
Courts should be limited to assessing whether or not the commitments amount 
to a manifest breach of the principle of proportionality.160 
The Commission was of the opinion that its decision did not breach the 
principle of proportionality, and also claimed that since 50% of Alrosa’s 
annual output was always reserved for the Russian market the jointly offered 
commitments would still reserve 36%161 of the remaining output to De Beers 
after 2010, and even more before that. The Commission also maintained that 
the agreement should be looked at against the background of the existing 
long-standing trading relations between Alrosa and De Beers, aimed at jointly 
regulating output and prices.162 
Against the argument that Alrosa’s contractual freedom had been limited for 
an indefinite period the Commission claimed this was not the case since 
proceedings may always be reopened under Article 9(2) of Regulation 
1/2003.163 Neither had Alrosa been discriminated against since its position 
vis-à-vis De Beers was different to the position of other suppliers due to its 
position as the primary competitor to De Beers as well as due to the 
long-standing trading relationship between the two.164 
 
4.2.3 Findings of the Court 
The General Court commenced by stating that the concept of an undertaking 
concerned ”relates to undertakings which are responsible for the conduct in 
question and which are liable to be penalised because of it”165 why Alrosa 
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could not be considered as such166. As concerns the claim by Alrosa that the 
Commission was in breach of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 as it had adopted 
its decision for an indefinite period the Court stated that while Article 9(1) 
provides a decision may be adopted for a specific period this is however not 
required.167 
 
The GC held that the Commission is always obliged to comply with the 
principle of proportionality as it constitutes a general principle of Community 
law.168 Moreover, the preamble of Regulation1/2003 states that in accordance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality the regulation should 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objective.169 Hence, 
decisions adopted under Article 9 are not relieved from compliance with the 
principle of proportionality. However, the Court withheld, the application of 
that principle should be different under Article 7(1) and under Article 9(1).170  
 
In order to attain the regulation’s main objective, to ensure the effective 
application of the competition rules laid down under the Treaty, the 
Commission possesses a margin of discretion as concerns whether it wishes 
to make commitments proposed by the undertakings concerned binding upon 
them under Article 9(1), or if it wishes to follow the procedure laid down 
under Article 7(1), in order to establish whether or not an infringement has 
occurred.171 This possibility does not however alleviate the Commission from 
the need to comply with the principle of proportionality when it chooses the 
first option.172 Article 9 should not be possible to exploit as a means of 
adopting decisions which would be regarded as disproportionate under 
Article 7.173 The GC stated that the burdens imposed on undertakings to end 
an infringement should not not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
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the  objective of re-establishing compliance with competition rules,174 Hence, 
the Commission would not be allowed to adopt a decision under Article 7 
“prohibiting absolutely any future trading relations between two undertakings 
unless such a decision is necessary to re-establish the situation which existed 
prior to the infringement”175. It went on to state that no difference between 
Article 7 and 9 can be invoked to allow any other conclusion to be reached 
regarding the limits to the Commission’s capacity to lay down binding 
measures under Article 9(1).176  
 
When adopting a decision, in a case where there is a choice between several 
appropriate remedies, the Commission must choose the least onerous, and any 
disadvantages must be proportionate to the aims pursued.177 The GC stated 
that the Commission had admitted there might have been uncertainties, a 
“grey zone”, between the commitments offered jointly by Alrosa and De 
Beers and the commitments offered solely by De Beers, as regards their 
suitability in addressing the competition concerns in an adequate manner.178 
However, the identification of which solution would have been most 
appropriate would have required such a complex economic assessment which 
Article 9 is intended to avoid. Due to this uncertainty, and the difficulty of 
establishing any alternative resolutions, the Commission concluded that that 
a complete prohibition represented the only appropriate solution.179  
 
The GC held that the Commission’s decision was vitiated by a manifest error 
in assessment, and that the aims of that decision could have been pursued 
through less onerous solutions than prohibiting all future trading between 
Alrosa and De Beers as of 2010.180  The Court claimed that the principle of 
proportionality demands that when there are measures known by the 
Commission, which are less onerous than those the Commission intends to 
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make binding, it should examine whether these less onerous measures may 
adequately address the competition concerns at hand, before adopting the 
more onerous measures.181 The jointly offered commitments were, without a 
doubt, less onerous than those made binding through the Commission 
Decision.182 Further, it was the view of the Court that they were, prima facie, 
capable of addressing the Commission’s competition concerns.183  
 
Further, the Court oppugned that the Commission had, in October 2005, 
proposed the commitments offered by De Beers and Alrosa to be amended in 
a way which would lead to them having no trading relations as of 2009.184 An 
infringement decision, the GC stated, in the case at hand, prohibiting all direct 
or indirect trading relations between the two undertakings, with effect of 2009 
and for an indefinite period, would have been a manifest breach of the 
principle of proportionality.185 The Commission cannot, the Court said, 
“lawfully propose to the parties that they should offer it commitments which 
go further than a decision which it could have adopted under Article 7(1) of 
Regulation No 1/2003.”186  
 
The Commission also exceeded its powers under Article 102 TFEU, as its 
decision obliged Alrosa, which was not subject to the procedure initiated 
under that article, to make significant structural and behavioural changes in 
order to compete with De Beers.187 Thus, the decisions had the effect of 
forcing a company not directly concerned by the proceedings to work for a 
change of the market structure.188 The Commission’s argument that the 
proceedings can be reopened under Article 9(2), and that the decision is thus 
not permanent, was not accepted by the Court.189 The exhaustive list of 
reasons why proceedings may be reopened does not include grounds such as 
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those Alrosa had based its application of annulment on, and further the 
Commission would still hold discretion in refusing to reopen the case.190  
 
As regards the first plea, an infringement of the right to be heard, the Court 
concluded that although Alrosa could not strictly speaking be classified as an 
undertaking concerned under Article 102 TFEU, it should have been afforded 
the rights given to an undertaking concerned due to the circumstances 
surrounding the case.191 Accordingly, Alrosa did hold a a right to be heard on 
the individual commitments proposed by De Beers.192 This aspect of the 
ruling, although interesting to discuss, does however not fit within the scope 
of this essay.  
 
The General Court found Alrosa’s all three pleas to be well founded, and 
proceeded to annul the Commission Decision through its judgement delivered 
on 11 July 2007.193  
 
4.3 The ECJ Ruling 
The Commission proceeded to, through an appeal, request that the ECJ set 
aside the judgment of the GC, thus dismissing Alrosa’ application to annul 
the Commission Decision.  The appeal was brought on two grounds.194 
 
1. The General Court infringed Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 and the 
principle of proportionality.  
2. The General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the right to be heard. 
 
 The Commission criticised how the General Court essentially had demanded 
the same examination of proportionality whether a decision is adopted under 
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Article 7 or Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission agreed that the 
principle of proportionality should apply to both Article 7 and Article 9 
decisions, however the Court’s positioning disregarded “the fundamental 
differences between those two provisions.”195 Further, the GC’s assessment, 
according to the Commission, deprived Article 9 of it practical effects, as it 
assessed the content of the principle of proportionality  when applying it to a 
decision under Article 9, by reference to how it is applied onto a decision 
under Article 7.196 The balancing exercise should not, claimed the 
Commission, be the same regardless of the legislative context in which it is 
carried out.197  Interestingly, the Commission even confessed that “it had been 
unable to determine the precise level of sales which would safely address all 
its concerns regarding competition” why it had accepted a commitment which 
saved time compared to a complex investigation.198. Through this statement 
the Commission acknowledged that there were possibly less onerous 
commitments available which would have sufficed to address the competition 
concerns. 
 
Alrosa stated that when a Commission decision is manifestly disproportionate 
under Article 7 even when an infringement is found, that same decision is 
even more disproportionate under Article 9, at least in such a case where that 
decision under Article 9 had “harmful consequences for a non-consenting 
undertaking which had the status of a party to the proceedings”, which Alrosa 
considered itself to be.199 
 
The ECJ began by confirming, as Advocate General Kokott had done in her 
Opinion on the case200, that the principle of proportionality, although not 
expressly referred to in Article 9,  remains a criterion for the lawfulness of 
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Commission decisions.201 However, regard must be taken to the differences 
in the means made available under Article 7 and 9 respectively, and the 
specific characteristics of each of these mechanisms.202 Hence, the 
Commission’s obligation to safeguard that the principle of proportionality is 
observed will be different in its extent and content, depending on which article 
it is considered in relation to.203 Article 7 requires a finding of infringement 
and provides the Commission with the power to impose any structural or 
behavioural remedy which is both proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to effectively bring that infringement to an end.204 
Article 9 does not require a finding of an infringement205, and thus merely 
confines upon the Commission to examine commitments that have been 
offered in order to meet its competition concerns.206 The application of the 
principle of proportionality, the ECJ stated, is therefore limited to confirming 
that the commitments in question address the Commission’s competition 
concerns and that the undertakings concerned have not offered less onerous 
commitments that would have also sufficed to address those concerns.207 This 
means the Commission must only choose between those commitments which 
have been offered, and determine which are the least onerous while yet 
addressing the competition concerns. However, the ECJ stated, the 
Commission must, in carrying out this assessment, still take into 
consideration the interests of third parties.208 
  
The ECJ further stated that the GC’s conclusion that it would be contrary to 
the scheme of Regulation 1/2003 if a decision which would be regarded as 
disproportionate under Article 7 in relation to an established infringement, 
could still be taken under Article 9, was incorrect.209  The two provisions 
pursue two different objectives. Article 7 aims to put an end to an established 
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infringement and Article 9 serves to address competition concerns expressed 
by the Commission following a preliminary assessment.210 Hence, the ECJ 
stated, there is no reason why a measure available in the context of Article 7 
should also have to function as a reference as regards what commitments the 
Commission may accept under Article 9.211 Neither is there any reason why 
something going beyond that measure automatically should be regarded as 
disproportionate. The application of the principle of proportionality differs 
depending on which of the two provisions is concerned.212 An undertaking 
offering commitments does so knowing these commitments may very well go 
beyond what the Commission could impose under Article 7. However, if 
these are accepted, the proceedings are closed, allowing the undertaking 
concerned to avoid a finding of an infringement of competition law and a 
potential fine.213 The ECJ proceeded to claim that despite the proportionality 
assessment applicable to a decision under Article 9 does not need to be as 
rigorous as if a decision was adopted under Article 7, this does not mean other 
undertakings are robbed of “the possibility of protecting the rights they may 
have in connection with their relations with that undertaking.”214  
 
Based on this assessment the ECJ concluded that the General Court had been 
in error when considering that the application of the principle of 
proportionality must be assessed, when adopting a decision under Article 9 
by reference to how it is assessed in the case of decisions taken under Article 
7 “despite the different concepts underlying those two provisions.”215  
 
Concerning the scope for judicial review of a commitment decision, the ECJ 
stated that this should relate “solely to whether the Commission’s assessment 
is manifestly incorrect.”216 The Commission is not obligated to itself 
investigate whether there are less onerous solutions available than the 
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commitments which have been offered.217 Here the Commission had 
concluded that the jointly offered commitments were not enough to address 
the competition concerns at hand, and thus fulfilled its only obligation in 
relation to the principle of proportionality.218 If the GC had found this 
conclusion was obviously unfounded, having regard to the facts established, 
it could have held that the Commission had committed a manifest error of 
assessment.219 The GC however, never made any such finding, according to 
the ECJ.220 Instead, the GC made its own assessment of the possibility to 
adequately address the Commission’s competition concerns through less 
onerous solutions than the one adopted by the Commission,221 This 
assessment included how the jointly offered  commitments could have been 
altered in order to achieve that effect.222 In this, the General Court encroached 
on the discretion of the Commission, by itself conducting an assessment of 
complex economic circumstances, and substituting the Commission’s 
assessment with its own.223 The ECJ proclaimed that this error of the General 
Court “in itself justifies setting aside the judgment under appeal.”224 
 
The General Court had also misinterpreted the concept of ‘undertaking 
concerned’ within the meaning of Regulation 1/2003 and thus wrongfully 
established an infringement on Alrosa’s right to be heard.225 In fact, Alrosa 
enjoyed only the less extensive rights of an interested third party.226 By its 
ruling on 29 June 2010 the ECJ rejected all pleas put forward by Alrosa and 
dismissed the application brought by it before the General Court.227 
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4.4 Opinion of the Advocate General 
Due to lack of space and the fact that Advocate General Kokott’s opinion228 
at large was coherent with the view of the ECJ, it cannot be afforded much 
room here.  However, interesting to note is the emphasis the Advocate 
General added concerning the right and interest of third parties. She expressed 
that “it is always necessary to examine, having regard to the interests of third 
parties, whether the commitments go beyond what is necessary in order to 
address the competition problems in question.”229 
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5 Issues and Uncertainties 
Regarding the Commitment 
Procedure 
 
This chapter further elaborates on some of the critique the commitment 
procedure and the Alrosa ruling have received. In this chapter my intention is 
to answer the second research question posed: What are the dangers of 
granting the Commission such a wide margin of discretion for adopting 
commitment decisions as the ECJ did in Alrosa? The information provided in 
this chapter also helps me with providing an answer to my third research 
question.  
 
The Morningstar ruling from 2016 is the only other case where the CJEU has 
ruled on the validity of a commitment decision. It is presented as an example, 
showing the effects of the Alrosa jurisprudence.  
 
5.1 T-76/14  Morningstar v 
Commission  
In 2009 the Commission opened proceedings against Thomson Reuters 
Corporation (‘Reuters’), a Canadian news and financial data company, 
regarding an alleged abuse of a dominant position in the worldwide market 
for consolidated real-time datafeeds, which provide banks and other financial 
institutions with market data from a variety of sources.230 In 2011 it adopted 
a preliminary assessment in accordance with Article 9(1) of Regulation 
1/2003 affirming that Reuters held a dominant position on the market and 
might also be abusing that position.231 The reason was that the company had 
been by imposing certain restrictions regarding the use of Reuters Instrument 
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Codes232 (‘RICs’) mainly on its own customers but also on third parties and 
competing datafeed  providers, thus creating substantial barriers for its 
customers to switching providers .233  
5.1.1 The Commission Decision 
Reuters, not agreeing with the assessment of the Commission, however 
offered commitments with the intention of addressing the competition 
concerns expressed by the Commission. The undertaking proposed to offer 
its customers the possibility to enter into a licence agreement concerning 
RICs, consequently allowing them to use RICs to retrieve data from datafeeds 
of competing providers.234 After concluding two market tests in accordance 
with Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission could finally accept 
Reuters’ commitments, which had then been revised twice, in late 2012.235 It 
adopted a decision236 pursuant to Article 9(1) making the revised 
commitments binding upon Reuters, and concluding that upon doing so it no 
longer had any grounds for action against the company.237 
5.1.2 The GC Ruling 
In 2014, one of Reuters’ competitors in the consolidated real-time datafeed 
market, Morningstar, challenged the Commission Decision before the 
General Court. Morningstar claimed that Reuters’ excluded competing 
providers from the licence and therefore also from the possibility of offering 
a fully comparable and competing service to Reuters’238 and that the GC 
should annul the Commission Decision as it was based on a manifest error of 
assessment, breached Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 by not addressing the 
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competition concerns, breached the principle of proportionality and infringed 
on the obligation to state reasons239.  
 
The Court first had to establish whether or not the action was admissible. In 
order for a private applicant to be allowed to challenge an EU act, in this case 
a Commission decision, the applicant must be both directly and individually 
concerned by that act, according to established case law.240 Directly meaning 
that the applicant’s legal situation must be directly affected, and individually 
meaning the act affects the applicant in a way which distinguishes it 
individually from all others.241 The GC concluded that Morningstar fulfilled 
both requirements.242  
 
However, vis-à-vis the remainder of the application Morningstar was less 
successful. The GC did not accept the argument that the Commission had 
made a manifest error in assessment by accepting commitments which did not 
address the competition concerns it had expressed.243 Just because 
competitors were not granted a possibility to enter into a license agreement 
concerning RICs this did not mean the competition concerns would not be 
addressed through the commitments.244 Rather, granting competitors this 
possibility would go beyond what was necessary in order to address the 
Commission’s concerns.245  
 
As response to Morningstar’s pleas regarding a breach of both Article 9(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003 and the principle of proportionality, the Court essentially 
reaffirmed what the ECJ had stated in Alrosa. The Commission enjoys a wide 
margin of discretion in accepting commitments under Article 9246 and 
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although decisions adopted on the basis of that article must abide by the 
principle of proportionality, the application of the principle differs from when 
a decision is adopted on the basis of Article 7, as the provisions pursue 
different aims.247  When reviewing commitments, the Commission must 
establish whether the commitments offered to them are  sufficient and can 
respond adequately to their concerns.248 In its proportionality assessment the 
Commission must first verify whether the commitments address the 
competition concerns expressed in the case, and secondly whether the 
undertakings concerned had offered less onerous commitments which would 
also sufficiently address these competition concerns.249 Any judicial review 
is limited to whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly erroneous.250 
As the Court had already concluded that the Commission had not committed 
a manifest error in assessment when accepting Reuters’ final commitments it 
could not accept Morningstar’s plea regarding a breach of Article 9(1) or the 
principle of proportionality.251  
 
Lastly, the GC did not agree that the Commission had failed to state reasons 
as to how the final commitments addressed the competition concerns which 
had been identified. It has set out “clearly and unequivocally, the factual 
elements and legal considerations which led it to conclude that the 
commitments were sufficient to address the competition concerns which had 
been raised.”252 The Court added that the Commission never has an obligation 
to explain why it abstained from adopting a different, but merely provide 
reasons for the decision it does adopt.253 
 
In September 2016 the GC delivered its ruling, dismissing Morningstar’s 
action in its entirety.254 Through this ruling the ECJ’s reasoning in Alrosa was 
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manifested, and the GC proved that also for competitors the bar is set very 
high when it comes to successfully challenging commitment decisions. 
Through these rulings the CJEU has effectively limited its own scope of 
judicial review of commitment decisions to the point where the chances of a 
commitment decision ending up before it is close to non-existent. 
 
One final aim of my research is to determine the effects of the Alrosa and 
Morningstar jurisprudence on the possibilities for third parties in challenging 
commitment decision. Thus a few words on the requirements for a private 
party to successfully challenge an EU act, such as a Commission decision, are 
given before the critique against the commitment procedure is presented.  
 
5.2 Challenging Commitment 
Decisions - Article 263 TFEU 
The article governing action against EU acts for private plaintiffs is, as has 
been mentioned above, Article 263 TFEU, more specifically the fourth 
paragraph. If an act is not addressed to the private party challenging the act, 
two requirements must be fulfilled; that the party is both directly and 
individually concerned. The meaning of these two requirements have been 
developed through ECJ jurisprudence. A direct concern means that the 
measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no 
discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task 
of implementing it.255 A private plaintiff is individually concerned by an EU 
act only if that act affects the plaintiff in a manner which distinguishes it from 
all other persons (judicial and natural), either by reason of certain attributes 
particular to that plaintiff or by reason of circumstances.256 This is quite high 
a threshold to surpass, and may certainly play a part in why a private third 
party may have difficulties challenging a commitment decision adopted by 
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the Commission. However, in this aspect, commitment decisions are not 
differentiated from other EU acts. Private parties are always disadvantaged 
when it comes to challenging an EU act, the reasons for which do not fall 
within the scope of this essay.  
 
As for what amounts to a direct and individual concern in the case of a third 
party challenging a commitment decision, Alrosa provides no general 
guidelines. The GC merely examined whether in the situation at hand, Alrosa 
should be regarded as both directly and individually concerned.257 I agree 
with the Court’s reasoning that Alrosa held such a position. In Morningstar 
however, the GC elaborated some on the requirements for a third party to a 
commitment decision to be regarded as individually concerned.258 One 
contributing factor was the market’s limited number of competitors, making 
Reuters’ abusive behaviour liable to having significant negative effects on 
Morningstar’s business.259 Secondly, Morningstar had actively participated in 
the procedure leading up to the decision.260 Due to this very active 
participation in the procedure, Morningstar was found to be individually 
concerned. Morningstar had e.g. requested and participated in several 
meetings with the Commission and submitted its observations in relation to 
the commitments on multiple occasions.261 The GC stated in its ruling that 
“Although mere participation in the procedure is, admittedly, insufficient on 
its own to establish that the contested decision is of individual concern to the 
applicant, the fact nevertheless remains that its active participation in the 
administrative procedure is a factor taken into account in the case-law relating 
to matters of competition including in the more specific area of commitments 
under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003”.262  This statement clarified 
something which was not addressed in Alrosa; that it takes more than 
participation in the procedure foregoing a Commission decision to fulfil the 
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requirements for admissibility for a private applicant. As the commitment 
made binding upon Reuters excluded its competitors from entering into 
license agreements concerning RICs, the decision affected Morningstar’s 
legal situation, making it directly concerned.263 
 
Yet, my main concern is not with the hinders Article 263 might cause an 
undertaking wishing to have a Commission decision annulled. Indeed, there 
are a few appeals by third parties against commitment decisions which have 
been declared by the GC as inadmissible due to a lack of locu standi. However 
dismissal was due to the appeals not having been brought within the time-
limit for instituting proceedings.264 My concern is rather that in a case where 
a private plaintiff is able to mount a challenge against a commitment decision 
the wide discretion granted to the Commission will be cause enough that the 
decision will not be overturned by a court. Both Alrosa and Morningstar are 
testaments to the fact that, although a private third party may achieve locu 
standi before the GC, or even the ECJ, under Article 263 TFEU, the discretion 
granted to the Commission is a larger hurdle to overcome, and may ensure 
that a commitment decision is at large protected from judicial review. 
 
The following sections provide for some of the criticism the commitment 
procedure has received. All comments presented have been laid forth after the 
ruling in Alrosa. 
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5.3 Critique Against the Commitment 
Procedure 
5.3.1 A Threat to Legal Certainty 
In his article from 2012, Florian Wagner-von Papp, professor at UCL265, 
expresses a number of concerns relating to a potential increase in incentive to 
engage in a commitment procedure from both the Commission’s and 
concerned undertakings’ perspective, after Alrosa.266 A limited scope of 
judicial review in combination with a negotiated outcome may lead to legal 
uncertainty and an inadequate protection of as well the public interest as third 
party interests.  
 
Von Papp’s largest concern relating to the commitment procedure is overuse, 
resulting in a decrease in litigated cases, which to a large extent define the 
limits of EU competition law and the legal principles surrounding it.267 In a 
case regarding a common legal issues this is less of a problem. However, in 
cases offering an opportunity to provide clarification in a rare situation, or 
dealing with a novel legal issue, it is worrisome that a full investigation by 
the Commission and the possibility for judicial review might not be 
available.268 As the ECJ limited the scope for judicial review of commitment 
decisions in Alrosa, adopting a commitment decision might be an easy way 
for the Commission to avoid such by the EU Courts. As was briefly brought 
up under chapter 2 national courts and NCAs are for the sake of uniform 
application of the Union competition rules very limited in their enforcement 
where the Commission has already adopted a decision. This is the case also 
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when that decision is taken under Article 9.269 This means not only can the 
Commission in adopting a commitment decision substitute its own full 
investigation for a bargained outcome, but it will probably also completely 
limit all possibility for judicial review of its decision, at the expense of legal 
certainty.270 Adding to this, von Papp fears that it is in precisely these type of 
cases, dealing with novel legal issue, that the Commission might be tempted 
to adopt a commitment decision rather than conduct a full investigation.271 
Where an infringement decision is adopted, the risk of judicial review is 
higher if the issue is novel. However, if the Commission opts for the 
commitment procedure, a review of its reasoning and decision can at large be 
avoided.272 It is my personal belief, that the fact that this possibility even 
exists inherently threatens legal certainty. 
 
Frederic Jenny, professor of Economics at ESSEC Business School in Paris 
and Chairman of the OECD Competition Committee, wrote an article in 2015 
titled “Worst Decision of the EU Court of Justice: The Alrosa Judgment in 
Context and the Future of Commitment Decisions”273. Hence, it is probably 
not hard to guess his stands in the debate.  Jenny gives a more direct critique 
to the effects of the ECJ’s reasoning in Alrosa. He highlights that it was 
initially the Commission’s idea that the commitment should be a complete 
cessation of all commercial relations between De Beers and Alrosa. Further 
he claims that the Commission made this suggestion knowing the remedy 
went beyond what was necessary to address its competition concerns.274 This 
means the main enforcer of EU law now has the power to both suggest and 
accept commitments which go beyond what is needed, and do so knowingly, 
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in the name of effectiveness.275 Such commitments may even end up putting 
unnecessary limits to the  freedom of undertakings, concerned and 
interested,276 to compete on the market. Jenny claims this behaviour 
contradicts the objectives of EU law.277  
 
Another possibility opened up to the Commission is that of using Article 9 in 
a situation where its theory of harm, which explains why an agreement or a 
practice may harm competition, might not be strong enough and hence might 
be questioned. Jenny states that “Commitment decisions offer an easy way to 
bypass both the complexity of articulating a theory of harm that would 
withstand the scrutiny of courts and economic experts and the risk that there 
would be a court challenge to the decision.”278  
 
Mario Mariniello, former Research Fellow at Bruegel, and current adviser to 
the European Political Strategy Centre, also articulates concerns regarding the 
Commission’s potentially insufficient theory of harm.279 Whilst commitment 
decisions can prove more efficient compared to infringement decisions, they 
come at the cost of a lacking in finding of infringement.280 Since there is no 
admittance of guilt, and a very slim chance that a commitment decision will 
be challenged in court, the Commission does not elaborate on its theory of 
harm in commitment decisions.281 Just as von Papp, Mariniello argues that 
the Commission might have strong incentives to opt for the commitment 
procedure in cases where there might actually exist a demand for a clear legal 
precedent to be set, preferably through a prohibition decision.282 This as the 
prospect of an Article 9 decision ending up in court is slim to none,283 as has 
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been previously established. A more novel legal issue, and development of 
theory of harm, consequently is open to a greater risk of judicial review by 
the EU Courts and possibly annulment. This lowers the interest of adopting 
infringement decisions in such cases, in favour of the commitment 
procedure.284 As infringement decisions are at a much higher rate challenged 
by the defendants, the pressure is higher on the Commission to carry out a 
thorough and correct assessment, developing on its theory of harm.285 
 
This brings with it two consequences which can counteract legal certainty. 
First, as the Commission does not develop on it competition concerns, there 
is less information which may facilitate independent action for damages by 
private parties.286 The Commission’s exposure to any external criticism is 
also limited, as there is often little information in a decision to expose.287 
Research by Mariniello shows commitment decisions tend to be as much as 
eight times shorter than infringement decisions.288 Secondly, commitment 
decisions in themselves offer little guidance to the undertakings on a certain 
market as to how the Commission will assess certain conduct, compared to 
an infringement decision. Due to this, there is little way of knowing what type 
behaviour to avoid, and issues dealt with through commitment decisions may 
be more likely to reoccur over time.289 Consequently, commitment decisions 
will also lack in deterrence compared to infringement decisions. Infringement 
decisions identify an infringement and set legal precedents as to what type 
behaviour should be avoided.290 The accompanying costs, such as fines,  
periodic penalty payments and follow-on damage claims provide for an 
effective compliment to the decision itself as a means of dissuasion.291 The 
very nature of a commitment decision on the other hand, provides for very 
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little deterrence, demanding no admittance of guilt nor being accompanied by 
a fine .292 
In September 2017 Damien Geradin, Professor of Competition Law and 
Economics at Tilburg University, and Evi Mattioli, research assistant at the 
Liege Competition and Innovation Institute, jointly wrote a paper on the 
commitment procedure. They ask the question whether commitment 
decisions are too much of a good thing.293 Drawing from the substantial 
decline in number of appeals submitted before the GC294, corresponding well 
with the Commission’s increased reliance on commitments, they sound a note 
of warning as to the Commission using the commitment procedure to increase 
its own level of discretion in assessing infringements.295 In cases investigated 
under Article 102 TFEU there is a larger tendency compared to e.g. in cartel 
cases that complex and novel legal questions come to rise.296 Geradin and 
Mattioli are worried that the Commission’s desire for effectiveness in 
procedure comes at the cost of thorough investigations. This brings with it a 
loss in guidance and evolution of case law by both the Commission and the 
the EU Courts.297 Their concerns hence mirror those of von Papp and 
Mariniello, that the Commission will opt for the commitment procedure in 
cases dealing with novel legal issues, as a way to avoid judicial review in such 
scenarios.298  
Their concerns regarding an enhanced Commission discretion in assessing 
potential infringements are not merely of a speculative nature. Geradin and 
Mattioli use the Commission’s investigation into the energy sector, and the 
high number of commitment decisions adopted as a result, as testimony to the 
Commission’s eagerness to apply an extensive interpretation to the concept 
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abuse of dominance.299 More specifically the outcome in two of those 
investigations; ENI300 and E.ON electricity301. In both cases the Commission 
adopted commitment decisions,  the commitments being of a structural 
nature, in situations lacking in previous jurisprudence from both the 
Commission and the EU Courts, instead of conducting a full investigation.302 
Geradin and Mattioli question whether these two cases even constituted an 
abuse of dominance. No matter if the final conclusion and outcome as regard 
the suspected infringements would have been the same, I do agree with them 
that in such cases a full analysis from the Commission should be carried out, 
and review from the EU Courts be available.303 Perhaps, this confirms the fear 
expressed by Jenny that the Commission will opt for the commitment 
procedure in cases it knows it theory of harm might not be strong enough, or 
where they knowingly have accepted commitments more onerous than 
necessary. 
Jenny articulates further concerns regarding the elevated risk of privation of 
legal certainty in Commission decisions following Alrosa. With its ruling, 
Jenny claims the ECJ essentially granted the Commission a possibility to shift 
its focus from identifying and fighting existing violations of competition law, 
to reshaping and regulating markets using structural commitments.304  The 
possibility to take such decisions, with no real court supervision, deprives the 
EU legal system of its legal predictability.305 Another issue relating to 
predictability, as identified by Mariniello, is the lowered incentives for the 
Commission to provide for accurate assessments of the cases before it, as 
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there is practically no risk its decision will be subject to ex-post legal 
review.306 
5.3.2 A Threat to the Interests of Third Parties, 
Consumers and the Public Interest 
Another issue identified by von Papp is the fact that in a commitment 
procedure, there is an elevated risk that neither the interest of identifiable third 
parties, nor the public interest, will be afforded a sufficient amount of 
protection.307 Both interests will to a great extent be represented by the 
Commission, but von Papp means that the Commission is probably not an 
equally reliable agent in representing these interests in a commitment 
procedure as it is in an infringement procedure.308 Firstly, because the 
Commission has not conducted a full investigation of the facts, and 
accordingly might not have a clear and correct picture of the case before it.309 
This means it cannot be sure that the remedies agreed upon are suitable, and 
a worst case-scenario is the Commission might agree to commitments  that 
are actually anticompetitive.310 Another important, however subtle, 
difference between the commitment procedure and the infringement 
procedure that might infringe on the safeguarding of third party and public 
interests, is the difference in the dynamics of the interaction.311  In a 
negotiation, such as the commitment procedure, both parties are much more 
likely to  make concessions as regards their own interests in the search for a  
mutually acceptable solution. This means the Commission’s and an 
undertaking’s interests can start to become more and more aligned as a 
consensual resolution seems closer and closer.312 This can in turn result in the 
Commission forsaking certain aspects of the public, or consumer,  interest for 
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the contentment of reaching such a consensual agreement, in ways it would 
not do in an infringement procedure.313 
 
Von Papp also identifies a potential problem with the difference in bargaining 
power between an undertaking in the process of offering commitments and 
the Commission. He is concerned with the fact that the Commission has the 
possibility of using the fact that an undertaking cannot be subject to follow-
on actions from private litigants when being subject to a commitment 
decision, as leverage. In the hopes of avoiding future private follow-on 
actions, an undertaking might be willing to agree to more far-reaching 
commitments, something the Commission might take advantage of, even 
more so knowing the scope for judicial review is so limited.314  
 
Mariniello argues that often a commitment decision may seem as a “win-win” 
solution. The undertaking suspected of an infringement avoids a potential 
infringement decision an accompanying fine, and the Commission can evade 
showing up with empty hands following an investigation.315 If the 
Commission has adopted a wrongful decision its own level of discretion 
protects it from judicial review of the courts.316 However this “win-win” 
narrative takes no account of the fact that there is actually a losing end. 
Consumers and affected third parties will need to trust that their interests have 
been accounted for by the Commission, and that any previous anti-
competitive effects to their detriment have been resolved through the 
commitment decision. However, they have very little means to check whether 
this is true, as very little information is given in a commitment decision.317 
Further, if they were to disagree with the Commission’s decision, my own 
view is that Alrosa and Morningstar have provided enough guidance as to the 
possibility of their success in challenging such. 
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5.3.3 Implications of The Court’s Assesment of 
Proportionality 
The ECJ ruling in Alrosa lays down a requirement for the Commission to 
choose the least restrictive commitments offered, provided they still 
adequately address the competition concerns.318  This is, according to the 
Court, the only requirement in order for the Commission to be acting in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.319 However, the reason there 
was even a choice to be made in Alrosa was due to the fact that Alrosa had 
been a subject in separate proceedings, regarding the same agreement’s 
potential infringement of Article 101 TFEU. In that procedure commitments 
had been offered jointly by Alrosa and De Beers. However, as von Papp 
explains, this is not a usual situation.320 Normally, third parties cannot submit 
alternative commitments. Rather the undertakings concerned will offer one 
set of commitments which the Commission can choose to accept or not. In 
such a case, the proportionality assessment demanded by the ECJ in Alrosa is 
entirely and effectively removed, according to von Papp.321 
 
Frederic Jenny also critiques the ECJ’s interpretation of the proportionality 
principle in Alrosa. He claims that the statement that the Commission has no 
duty to suggest or investigate less onerous commitments than those which 
have been offered but which could still address its competition concerns, 
completely disregards the subject of consistency between the effectiveness of 
the solution, i.e. the commitments, and the objectives of competition law.322 
This means the Commission could end up accepting commitments which 
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actually terminate a competition violation but does so at the cost of interested 
undertakings “strategic freedom… to compete on the market”323. This is a 
similar concern to what von Papp expresses in his article, that the 
Commission might accept commitments having anti-competitive effects. 
5.3.4 A Lack in Appeals 
Upon analysing the number of appeals to commitment decisions between 
2000 and 2016, Geradin and Mattioli finds that such an appeal has never come 
from an undertaking which was itself subject to a commitment decision.324 
This is no doubt explained by the, at least in theory, voluntary nature of 
commitments.325 
 
As the ECJ’s reasoning in Alrosa quite clearly limits to what extent a third 
party can challenge a commitment decision as disproportionate, Geradin and 
Mattioli state that the “responsibility” to avoid a disproportionate 
commitment decision lies on the undertakings subject to the decision upon 
their offering of commitments. They must resist offering commitments that 
go beyond what is necessary in order to address the Commission’s 
competition concerns.326 However I agree with Geradin and Mattioli when 
they conclude that this is an unlikely outcome, as the alternative for an 
undertaking offering less onerous commitments than the Commission 
requests may be a large fine.327 Another spotted trend is that since 2011, the 
year after the ECJ’s ruling in Alrosa, the number of appeals filed against 
Commission decisions, have decreased steadily.328 Geradin and Mattioli draw 
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no such conclusions, but I would not be surprised if one reason for this 
tendency is the outcome in Alrosa, combined with the fact that the 
commitment procedure becoming the by far most common way to adjudicate 
suspected competition infringements.329 Even before the Alrosa and 
Morningstar jurisprudence, undertakings subject to commitment decisions 
did not bring appeals against them. Since the ECJ raised the bar for third 
parties challenging commitment decisions, I find this development logical.   
5.3.5 Regulating Markets through Commitment 
Decisions 
Jenny fears the Commission is using the commitment procedure as a way of 
regulating markets, imposing structural remedies it could not enforce under 
Article 7.330 The most expressive example is the Commission’s treatment of 
the energy sector, as also mentioned by Geradin and Mattioli. In the years 
between 2004 and 2014 the Commission adopted eleven commitment 
decision in that sector331, four of which regarded structural changes332. Article 
7 limits the possibility to impose structural remedies to cases where there are 
no equally effective behavioural remedies. However, Article 9 includes no 
such distinction between which type of remedy is appropriate, why the 
Commission will be prone to favour the commitment procedure in a case 
where it pursues structural modifications on specific a market.333 This chance 
increases even more since the  risk of an appeal against a commitment 
decision was always lower than the risk of an appeal against an infringement 
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decision334, and it is my personal view that since Alrosa that risk has been 
reduced even more.  
 
Geradin and Mattioli provide for a useful reminder in their paper in this 
context – namely that the role of the Commission acting as a competition 
authority is not to regulate specific markets and sectors, but to take action 
against breaches of competition law and adopting decisions with remedies 
suitable to end such breaches.335  
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6 Successfully Challenging a 
Commitment Decision 
 
With this chapter I aim to conclude my own findings as concerns the 
implications of the two above depicted rulings, with an aim of determining 
their effects on the possibilities of third parties of challenging commitment 
decisions. I aim to, through analysing the rulings in Morningstar and Alrosa, 
together with the critique presented and discussed in all the above chapter, 
provide an answer to the third and final research question of this thesis, which 
is divided into two: Given the Commission’s wide margin of discretion, and 
the rulings in both Alrosa and Morningstar, what are the real possibilities for 
a third party of successfully challenging a commitment decision? Are 
commitment decisions protected from an appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny? 
6.1 Implications of the Commitment 
Procedure and its Jurisprudence  
As has been revealed, the undertakings concerned by a commitment decision 
are highly unlikely to challenge it. In fact, this has never happened in the now 
13 years the procedure has been available for use. This can quite easily be 
explained by the, at least seemingly, voluntary nature of commitments. 
Additionally, the fear of an infringement decision and an accompanying fine 
probably leads undertakings to accept to commit, even if the commitments 
are more onerous than what they would want to offer. As the analysed case 
law has shown, it need not be that the Commission simply chooses to accept 
or decline, upon receiving commitment offers from an undertaking under 
investigation. On the contrary, the Commission might even itself make 
suggestions as to what it considers a suitable commitment might be.336  
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If such a situation were to occur the Commission even holds the ability to 
suggest commitments knowing that less onerous ones would suffice, as it did 
in Alrosa. Of course, the entire commitment procedure is a balancing act, 
between the legitimate objective of promoting effectiveness in enforcement 
on one hand, and values such as legal certainty and predictability, 
successfully restoring competition to affected markets and the protection of 
third parties on another. A suggestion regarding commitments, from the 
Commission, may lead to a swifter conclusion of the case at hand, saving 
resources and putting a faster end to the suspected anti-competitive behaviour 
which is being investigated. However, in such a case, where the Commission 
itself actually suggests commitments, knowing these go beyond what is 
necessary, and without carrying out such a complex economic assessment 
which would be necessary to determine which other, adequately efficient, 
commitments could have been accepted instead, clearly the commitment 
procedure is not appropriate. Still, there seems to be no obstacles to the 
Commission using it in such situations. In Alrosa the Commission admitted 
to having the knowledge that less onerous commitments would suffice, 
however not exactly what they would consist of.337 I find it unsettling that the 
Commission can suggest such burdensome commitments, especially knowing 
undertakings are largely inclined to accept such due to the fear of being 
subject to an infringement procedure. 
 
There are clear advantages of opting for the commitment procedure for the 
Commission. These advantages also apply in cases where the commitment 
procedure might not be the most suitable, or perhaps even more so. A lack of 
judicial review compared to what is available when an infringement decision 
is adopted under Article 7 brings with it the possibility to stretch the limits of 
what can be offered in, and achieved through, commitment decisions. Given 
the current legal situation, the Commission holds the power to use a 
commitment decision as an instrument to not only correct the individual 
situation at hand, but to reshape markets, restructure specific sectors and 
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unsupervised decide upon novel legal issues. In addition, as stated above, the 
Commission itself may be the author of those commitments. This means the 
Commission can both suggest the commitments and go on to adopting the 
decisions making these binding. This creates a situation where an institution 
basically has the power to rule on its own suggestions, which produce actual 
legal effects. In addition to this, the scope for judicial review is limited to 
establishing whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect,338 
which is quite an easy test to pass.  Alrosa displays a situation where the 
Commission both suggested the commitments that were made binding, and 
were aware of them being overly onerous. Still, the ECJ did not conclude that 
the Commission had carried out a manifestly incorrect assessment. Neither 
was that the conclusion in Morningstar.  
 
The ENI and E.ON electricity decisions show another drawback of the 
commitment procedure. They were both adopted in situations lacking in 
previous jurisprudence, however without any appeals submitted against them. 
Accordingly, the Commission has successfully been able to substitute its own 
full investigation, and the possibility for judicial review by a court, for the 
commitment procedure in cases regarding novel legal issues. This does go 
against the intentions of the commitment procedure. The Commission itself 
clearly states in its Policy Brief from 2014 that when there is a need to set a 
legal precedent, the Commission should opt for the infringement procedure. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, infringement decisions are reasoned in 
more detail, providing more guidance to those active on the market, and 
developing on the theory of harm behind the decision.339 Secondly, as an 
infringement decision is more likely to be challenged in front of the CJEU, 
providing an opportunity for further clarification of the law. However, it does 
not seem the Commission follows its own policy in every case. Certainly, this 
context opens up for a possibility for misuse of power, as the Commission 
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can now also expand its discretion regarding what behaviour in relation to the 
EU competition law provisions can be sanctioned.  
 
The Commission might of course give a suggestion for commitments, or 
merely accept those offered to it, unknowing of the fact that actual less 
onerous options are available, as its preliminary investigation will not always 
be enough to get a clear overview of the situation at hand. This risk is pointed 
out by von Papp above. My concerns then still lie with the fact the wide 
margin of discretion granted to the Commission seems to impede the 
possibility of having a decision ordering such commitments binding 
successfully challenged and overturned.  
 
6.2 The Real Possibilities for a Third 
Party to Succesfully Challenge a 
Commission Decision  
While it is highly doubtful that any undertaking which is the addressee of a 
commitment decision will challenge it, third parties might still wish to do so, 
as they may be affected by the contents of such a decision. The two cases 
analysed in this essay portray two very different reasons for challenge. In 
Alrosa the commitments were regarded as too onerous by the third party, and 
in Morningstar they were not regarded as sufficient to address the 
competition concerns expressed by the Commission. No matter, the final 
rulings hold the same message. From where I stand, the EU Courts’ 
jurisprudence is clear. The Commission’s margin of discretion in assessing 
commitments and adopting commitment decisions, at large limits any real 
possibility for a third party to successfully challenge such a decision in front 
of a court. At the same time, in the only two cases where the EU Courts have 
ruled on the validity of commitment decisions the applicants have both been 
third parties. As it seems third parties are the only actual parties currently 
submitting appeals to commitment decision, the limiting of their doing so may 
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mean limiting the real possibility for judicial review of commitment 
decisions.  
 
Hopefully this is not the case. Article 263 does favour other applicants 
compared to private parties, in their ability to challenge EU acts. These 
include the EU Institutions and all Member States.340 However, even if I 
myself hope that these would interfere in the event that the Commission 
would adopt a decision able of generating particularly negative consequences 
for the public interest, or overall competition law, a challenge to a 
commitment decision from such an applicant has yet to come. Neither is there 
is any way of knowing whether the CJEU would adopt a different view on 
Commission discretion and its own scope for judicial review just because the 
challenge came from one of the above mentioned applicants. Their possibility 
for success might be just as limited as a third party’s has proven to be. 
 
As the EU Courts clearly have gone the route of taking a rather hands-off 
approach to commitment decisions, it does not seem likely that an appeal 
against such a decision will succeed. However, there are still chances for a 
third party to be able to affect a commitment decision before it is adopted. 
Active participation in the Commission’s proceedings leading up to a decision 
is crucial in this respect. 341  This includes participating in the market testing 
stage, submitting opinions and evidence to the Commission regarding the 
identified competition concerns as well as the commitments’ suitability as to 
address them. This can not only help shape the Commission’s assessment as 
to what commitments are appropriate in a certain case, and reveal weaknesses 
in the draft commitments. In the case of CISAC342 third party opinions lead to 
the Commission abandoning the commitment procedure entirely and choose 
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the infringement proceeding instead. That decisions was later annulled by the 
GC343, something that probably would not have been possible if the 
Commission had adopted a commitment decision instead.  In the case of 
Google344 the Commission struggled with finding appropriate commitments 
for over four years without succeeding. In the end, the amount of opposition 
and hostility expressed towards the numerous commitments offered lead the 
Commission to revert to the process under Article 7.345 Important to note 
however, is that these two cases are the only occasions upon which this has 
happened346, and in Google the critique came also from within the EU 
Institutions, something which probably affected the outcome.347  
 
Two very recent events are however offering further possibilities for the EU 
Courts to develop on what level of judicial scrutiny should be afforded 
commitment decisions, perhaps correcting some, in my view, previous 
mistakes. 
6.2.1 A Hopeful Future? 
The most recent development is the delivery of a preliminary ruling by the 
ECJ. For the sake of uniformity, in a matter where the Commission has 
already adopted a decision, a national court may not deliver a ruling running 
counter to that decision.348 Accordingly, the national courts of the EU 
Member States do not constitute effective authorities for a party wishing to 
challenge a commitment decision. However, the preliminary ruling delivered 
by the ECJ on 23 November 2017, may have implications for the role of 
national courts.349 The ruling centres around the question of to which extent 
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national courts are bound by a commitment decision. This is governed by 
Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, which states the following: 
 
 “When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices 
under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the 
subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions 
running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission…”.  
 
The dispute related to agreements between undertakings Repsol, a global 
energy company, and a small undertaking named Gasorba, leasing and 
operating a service station. The Commission considered that the agreements 
were able to create a foreclosure effect on the Spanish retail fuel market and 
instituted proceeding against Repsol under Article 101 TFEU. Repsol replied 
offering commitments in accordance with Article 9, which were made 
binding upon them in 2006.350 Following the decision, Gasorba and Others 
brought an action against Repsol before the Madrid Commercial Court in 
2008. Their claims were firstly, an annulment of the lease agreement on the 
ground that it was contrary to Article 101 TFEU and, secondly, compensation 
for the harm arising from the application of that agreement.351 The case ended 
up before the Spanish Supreme Court. Gasorba and Others held that a 
commitment decision should not preclude a national court from declaring an 
agreement to which that decision applies invalid for infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU, and thus brought an appeal on a point of law.352 
 
The Supreme Court went on to send a request for a preliminary ruling to the 
ECJ, asking ”whether Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 must be 
interpreted as precluding a national court from declaring an agreement 
between undertakings void on the basis of Article 101(2) TFEU, when the 
Commission has accepted beforehand commitments concerning that 
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agreement and made them binding in a decision taken under Article 9(1) of 
that regulation.”353 The ECJ began by mentioning the importance of a uniform 
application of EU competition law, which Article 16(1) is meant to ensure.354 
However, recital 13 of the same regulation establishes that as a commitment 
decision does not include a finding of infringement, a commitment decision 
does not preclude a national court from making such a finding, nor from 
deciding on the case.355 Recital 22 adds that a commitment decision does not 
affect the powers of a Member States court to apply Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.356 Since a commitment decision does not involve a finding of 
infringement, or establish a lack thereof, a national court can conclude its own 
finding in this regard without jeopardising the uniformity of EU law. 
However up until now there has been no clear guidance as to how this could 
practically work. Nonetheless, the Court added, the principle of sincere 
cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU and the objective of applying EU 
competition law effectively and uniformly both require that the national court 
take into consideration the Commission’s preliminary assessment leading up 
to the commitment decision, before delivering a ruling.357 The ECJ’s answer 
to the posed question posed was that ”…Article 16(1) of Regulation No 
1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a commitment decision 
concerning certain agreements between undertakings, adopted by the 
Commission under Article 9(1) of that regulation, does not preclude national 
courts from examining whether those agreements comply with the 
competition rules and, if necessary, declaring those agreements void pursuant 
to Article 101(2) TFEU.” 
With this ruling a chance has been established for third parties to commitment 
decisions to bring action against an agreement being subject to a commitment 
decision before a national court, and being “released” from such an agreement 
as a result. Perhaps this can lead to other challenges, similar to that in 
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Gasorba, coming before the national courts of the Member States, meaning 
the ECJ might be given further opportunities to develop on the powers of 
national courts in relation to commitment decisions. This possibility could 
have helped an undertaking such as Alrosa, had it wanted to be completely 
released from its agreement with De Beers directly rather than first decrease 
its level of sales gradually over a few years before the termination of the 
agreement. However, this does not mean the commitment decision will not 
continue to bind the undertakings concerned by it, even if some of the 
commitments pertaining to a certain agreement might be hard to fulfil where 
that agreement has been declared void. It is my hope that Gasorba might lead 
to new possibilities of judicial review and a more appropriate level of 
possibility for judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions, even if in the case 
at hand the commitment decision was not what was being challenged, but the 
agreement subject to it. As the ECJ and Advocate General Kokott pointed out 
in Gasorba, commitment decisions do not have the power of legalising certain 
market behaviour, just because there is no finding of infringement 
involved.358 Neither should a commitment decision have the power to bind a 
third party to an illegal agreement. Accordingly, the possibility for judicial 
review of a certain agreement or behaviour should not be limited just because 
the Commission has adopted a commitment decision regarding that same 
behaviour. The possibility for national courts to declare void an agreement or 
a type behaviour the Commission has made subject to a commitment decision 
challenges the perception that commitment decisions are essentially definitive 
and unshakeable. This is in my opinion a promising first step towards a more 
questioning and scrutinising attitude towards such decisions, which might 
keep the Commission away from potentially abusing its powers.  
The second event is a new application for annulment of a commitment 
decision submitted by a third party. Though it may seem any actual possibility 
for a third party to successfully mount a challenge to a commitment decision 
has been erased, this has apparently not discouraged everyone. In February 
this year, details were published in the Official Journal of an appeal brought 
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in December 2016 by French undertaking Groupe Canal + (hereinafter ‘Canal 
+’) to challenge a Commission decision under Article 9, accepting 
commitments from Paramount Pictures.359 Through its decision, the 
Commission made binding commitment offered by Paramount.360 The 
commitments addressed the Commission’s concerns regarding certain clauses 
in film licensing contracts for pay-tv between Paramount and British 
undertaking Sky UK. The clauses regarded territorial exclusivity, so-called 
"geo-blocking", meaning Sky was not allowed to offer customers outside the 
UK and Ireland the possibility of watching certain Paramount content. 
Paramount was to ensure that no other broadcaster could offer that same 
content in the UK and Ireland.361 Paramount’s commitment includes to 
neither act upon nor enforce such clauses in any of its existing licensing 
contracts for pay-tv with any broadcaster in the European Economic Area 
(EEA).362 Neither shall Paramount  (re)introduce such clauses in any film 
licensing contract for pay-tv with any broadcaster in the EEA.363  
 
The decision was adopted on 27 July last year, and was made binding for a 
period of five years. Canal + submitted an appeal seeking that the decision be 
annulled, as the decision affects its existing agreements with Paramount.364 
Canal + claims that the geo-blocking clauses the Commission considers to be 
anti-competitive “are on the contrary necessary for effective competition on 
the merits on the pay-tv market.”365 This is yet another category of third party 
applicant than in Alrosa or Morningstar. 
 
Whether the GC will accept the appeal or not has yet to show. However, the 
fact that a third party still feels inclined to submit an appeal sends a message 
                                                
359 T-873/16: Action brought on 8 December 2016 — Groupe Canal + v European 
Commission, OJ C 38, 6.2.2017. 
360 Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, (Case AT.40023 
– Cross-border access to pay-TV).  
361 AT.40023 – Cross-border access to pay-TV, rec 25-33. 
362 Ibid, rec 56. 
363 Ibid, rec 55. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Groupe Canal + v European Commission, OJ C 38, 6.2.2017, para 1. 
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that not everyone is of the opinion that the chance of success is too 
insignificant for it to be worth a try. 
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
To conclude the findings of this essay, I feel safe in claiming that the 
commitment procedure available under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 brings 
with both positive outcomes as well as negative. My own greatest concerns 
lie with the very limited possibility for judicial review, and its effects on legal 
certainty. 
 
The EU Courts have afforded the Commission a vast discretion in assessing 
commitments. This is paired with no actual limit set out in law as to which 
scenarios must be subject to full investigations and the possibility for review 
by the courts. Hence, the Commission can provide its own interpretation to 
novel legal issues, reshape specific markets and sectors, and enforce changes 
through commitments even in cases where its theory of harm might not hold 
up. The commitment procedure has become a loophole for the Commission, 
protecting its actions from judicial review from the EU Courts. Upon limiting 
its own scope of judicial review for commitment decisions the EU Courts 
have also granted the Commission discretion in assessing what type 
behaviour can be sanctioned in relation to Article 101 and 102 TFEU.  
 
Through its case law the EU Courts have also drastically limited the 
possibility of having a commitment decision overturned. In doing so they 
have considerably raised the bar for third party applicants to successfully 
challenge a commitment decision. This is worrying as third parties have so 
far been the only to mount such challenges. Still, commitment decisions have 
not become untouchable per se, as other applicants may come to challenge 
such decisions in the future, probably depending on the Commission’s 
behaviour. However, third parties’ chances to affect a commitment decision 
are in the present situation greater before the decision has even been adopted, 
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and the current legal situation does not seem to provide third parties with any 
real possibilities of challenging commitment decisions. These limitations in 
my view shape a system with an overall lack in the existence of judicial 
scrutiny available against commitment decisions. 
 
However, two recent developments provide some ease. The first one being 
the ECJ’s ruling in Gasorba dating just a few weeks old, the second being 
Canal +’s application for annulment submitted in December 2016. Perhaps 
the possibilities for judicial review of commitment decisions are now starting 
to enhance, rather than diminish further. 
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